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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of delegating control of sovereign debt issuance to an 
independent authority in a monetary union where public spending decisions are decentralized. 
The model assumes that no policy makers are capable of commitment to a rule. However, 
consistent with Rogoff (1985) and with the recent history of central banking, it assumes that 
an institution may be designed to have a strong preference for achieving some clear, simple, 
quantitative policy goal. 
Following Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), we show that in a monetary union where a single 
central bank interacts with many member governments, debt is excessive relative to a social 
planner’s solution. We extend their analysis by considering the establishment of an independent 
fi scal authority (IFA) mandated to maintain long-run budget balance. We show that delegating 
sovereign debt issuance to an IFA in each member state shifts down the time path of debt, 
because this eliminates aspects of defi cit bias inherent in democratic politics. Delegating to 
a single IFA at the union level lowers debt further, because common pool problems across 
regions’ defi cit choices are internalized. 
The establishment of a federal government with fi scal powers over the whole monetary 
union would be less likely to avoid excessive defi cits, because only the second mechanism 
mentioned above would apply. Moreover, the effective level of public services would be lower, 
if centralized spending decisions are less informationally effi cient.
Keywords: fi scal authority, delegation, decentralization, monetary union, sovereign debt.
JEL classifi cation: E61, E62, F41, H63.
Resumen
Este trabajo estudia la delegación de la emisión de deuda soberana en una autoridad 
independiente, en el contexto de una unión monetaria donde el gasto público se determina de 
manera descentralizada. En el modelo, ningún agente puede comprometerse defi nitivamente 
a seguir una regla. Pero, en línea con Rogoff (1985) y con la historia reciente de los bancos 
centrales, el modelo supone que se puede diseñar una institución de manera que prefi era 
cumplir con algún objetivo claro, concreto y cuantitativo. 
Siguiendo el análisis de Beetsma y Bovenberg (1999), demostramos que el nivel de deuda 
es excesivo (respecto a la solución de un planifi cador social) en una unión monetaria 
donde un único banco central interactúa con muchos estados miembros. Extendemos el 
modelo de Beetsma y Bovenberg para considerar el establecimiento de una autoridad fi scal 
independiente (IFA en inglés) cuya meta es el mantenimiento del equilibrio presupuestario a 
largo plazo. Demostramos que la delegación de la emisión de deuda soberana en una IFA 
en cada estado miembro desplaza hacia abajo la senda temporal de la deuda. Esto se debe 
a la eliminación de los factores del sesgo defi citario que son resultado de la política electoral. 
Delegar la deuda soberana en una única IFA comunitaria disminuye aún más la deuda, al 
internalizarse el problema de recursos en común entre los estados miembros.
Establecer un único gobierno federal para la unión monetaria tendría menos impacto 
sobre el défi cit, porque se solucionaría el problema de recursos en común, pero no el del 
sesgo defi citario de la democracia. Al mismo tiempo, el nivel efectivo de servicios públicos 
proporcionado por el gobierno federal podría ser menor, debido a la menor efi ciencia de 
información asociada con decisiones centralizadas.
Palabras clave: autoridad fi scal independiente, delegación de políticas, descentralización, 
unión monetaria, deuda soberana.
Códigos JEL: E61, E62, F41, H63.
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1 Introduction
In the summer of 2012, when President Draghi expressed an unambiguous commitment
to preserve the Eurozone, returns on peripheral European debt plummeted. After
peaking at over 5%, premia on Spanish and Italian debt were both below 3% in early
2013,1 illustrating just how easily central banks can combat speculative attacks on
bonds issued in a currency they control. Since the ECB can, in principle, emit unlimited
quantities of euros, it can buy any quantity of euro-denominated debt, and thereby put
a floor under Eurozone sovereign bond prices. Nonetheless, further reforms are needed
to make Eurozone institutions viable in the long run. While the ECB can conjure
up a cap on the risk premium through monetary policy alone, this will eventually be
inflationary if peripheral countries fail to balance their budgets over the longer term.
Therefore a monetary mechanism to prevent speculative attacks must be accompanied
by an adequate fiscal regime if it is to ensure the permanence of the euro.
Proposals for fiscal reform have revolved around two competing interpretations of
“fiscal union”. Many economists and political leaders argue that it is time to con-
summate the founders’ vision of a strong federal Europe with a government able to
transfer resources countercyclically, from economies in expansion to those in recession.2
But European electorates are skeptical of placing more power in the hands of Brussels.
And core member states with healthy public finances have objected to a “fiscal transfer
union”, as they call it, because of the moral hazard it creates.3 Fearing that they could
end up paying for the fiscal imbalances of others, these members instead advocate a
“fiscal stability union”, meaning a reinforcement of the debt and deficit limits, backed
by monitoring and sanctions, that constituted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
Unfortunately, there is no consensus about how to ensure that a rule-based framework
would succeed in the future, when so many member states broke the rules in the past.
However, it is wrong to assume that “fiscal transfer union” and “fiscal stability
union” are the only options for greater fiscal discipline in Europe. As a voluntary
association of nation states with large governments and distinct cultural identities,
the EMU is sui generis, and there is no reason to suppose that institutions which
1The Economist (19 January 2013).
2See for example Financial Times (8 December 2010), The Wall Street Journal (3 June 2011) or
Pisani-Ferry (2012).
3See The Economist (2 December 2010).
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have succeeded elsewhere will be appropriate for Europe.4 While many countries suf-
fer budgetary problems today, fiscal indiscipline may be especially problematic in a
monetary union: member countries may overexploit the joint budget as a common re-
source; members may expect others to rescue them if they get into trouble; and market
doubts about any member’s solvency may spread contagiously across the union. For
all these reasons, members of a monetary union need strong fiscal regimes to ensure
long-run budget balance. But by itself this is not enough: beyond ensuring their own
solvency, peripheral Eurozone states must also convince core states that their solvency
is ensured. Otherwise, core members will be unwilling to help protect them from spec-
ulative attacks; and thus even if they slash deficits enough for solvency at low interest
rates, they will remain unprotected against a self-fulfilling spiral to higher rates at
which they become insolvent. This analysis suggests that the Eurozone requires much
stronger fiscal discipline than has been the norm in other economies.
This paper considers another way to reinforce fiscal discipline in Europe: the dele-
gation of executive control over one or more powerful fiscal instruments to an indepen-
dent institution with a mandate to ensure long-run budget balance. The motivation
for fiscal delegation follows from Rogoff’s (1985) analysis of central bank independence:
delegating discretionary control of monetary instruments can solve the problem of in-
flationary bias, without requiring an inflexible commitment to low inflation under all
circumstances, as long as the preferences of the central bank incorporate a counter-
vailing, anti-inflationary bias. Since the mandates of contemporary central banks are
strongly focused on low inflation, and since these banks control instruments that make
low inflation feasible, they have acted “conservatively” in Rogoff’s sense even in the
absence of formal rules relating to inflation only. Likewise, the establishment of an
independent authority with a mandate for low debt or low deficits might successfully
combat deficit bias, as long as it controls instruments of sufficient power to make debt
control feasible. While this idea has been largely absent from the current Eurozone
debate, frameworks like this have been proposed for many countries and regions, includ-
ing Australia and New Zealand (Ball (1996), Gruen (1997)); the US (Blinder (1997),
Seidman and Lewis (2002)); Latin America (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen
(1999)); and the European Union (von Hagen and Harden (1995); Wren-Lewis (2002);
Wren-Lewis (2011); Calmfors (2003); Wyplosz (2005); Costain and de Blas (2012a)).
4In particular, in the short and medium run, we doubt that the US experience is informative for
the EMU, for two main reasons. First, the EMU has less consensus for political integration than the
US does; in fact, the crisis may be increasing the divisions between member states. Second, member
states play a much larger fiscal role in the EMU than US states do, making a policy of zero deficits
at all times costlier (and less credible) for EMU members than it is for US states.
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But while this idea has been widely advocated, there has been very little theoretical
work to evaluate the effects of policy delegation in a fiscal context.5
Thus, our model studies the effects of Rogoff-style delegation of fiscal powers in
the context of a monetary union. Our environment follows Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1999, henceforth BB99), who study the interaction of a single central bank with many
national (or regional) governments. Like Rogoff (1985), the BB99 paper posits a time-
inconsistency problem like that of Barro and Gordon (1983): a surprise increase in
inflation stimulates output, giving the central bank an incentive to choose an inflation
rate higher than the public expects. Inside a monetary union, this inflation bias also
gives rise to deficit bias by way of a common pool problem: while governments know
that the central bank will be tempted to inflate away the public debt, each individual
national government ignores the impact of its own debt, since this is only a small part of
the total. Therefore, BB99 conclude that welfare is improved if fiscal policy is bound by
rules limiting debt or deficits. But this analysis is built around a strange inconsistency:
it is unclear why they take for granted that the central bank must act under discretion
while assuming that the government’s fiscal decisions can (and advocating that they
should) be bound by a commitment to rules.6
Our paper strives for a more consistent treatment of rules versus discretion. We
assume that no policy makers can commit– that is, given the risk of unforeseen future
contingencies, no institution can irreversibly oblige itself to follow a rule. However,
consistent with Rogoff (1985) and with the recent history of central banking, we as-
sume that an institution may be designed to have a strong preference for achieving
some clear, simple, quantitative goal. Just as contemporary central banks display a
strong aversion to inflation, we consider a hypothetical independent budgetary author-
ity with a strong aversion to debt. We compare the baseline scenario of BB99, in
which the central bank has discretionary control of inflation and the government has
discretionary control of all aspects of fiscal policy, with an alternative institutional ar-
rangement in which the government controls the allocation of public spending, but an
independent fiscal authority controls the emission of debt. As BB99 already showed,
under the baseline scenario a monetary union with many member states exhibits ex-
cessive debt accumulation, relative to a social planner’s solution. We show in addition
5Persson and Tabellini (1994) explore a different aspect of fiscal policy delegation. They point
out that representative democracy is a form of policy delegation, and in line with Rogoff (1985),
they argue that the median voter may prefer a representative with a relatively “conservative” view of
capital taxation, in order to offset the problem of time inconsistency.
6Many papers written around the time of the introduction of the euro to provide theoretical backing
for the Stability and Growth Pact simply assumed that rules, once established, would be followed.
See for example Buti, Roeger, and In’t Veld (2001).
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that delegating control of debt issuance to an independent authority in each member
state decreases debt at all points in time. This follows from the greater debt aversion
and lower impatience of the fiscal authority, compared with a democratic government.
Delegating instead to a single independent authority at the level of the union shifts
down the time path of debt again, because a union-level authority internalizes common
pool problems associated with decentralized fiscal decisions. At the same time, this
alternative institutional setup maintains the advantages of subsidiarity, by leaving the
allocation of public spending to be decided at the national level, where information is
better and democratic legitimacy is greater.
In our baseline model, which follows BB99 closely, deficit bias in the monetary union
is a side-effect of inflation bias. Arguably, inflationary bias is not really relevant under
the current European monetary framework. However, other types of deficit biases, due
to moral hazard or contagion, might be present. Therefore, in Section 4, we extend
our model to include the possibility of contagion across governments’ borrowing rates.
We show that this contagion creates another form of deficit bias, also induced by a
common pool problem: each government feels the full benefit when it runs a higher
deficit, but the effect of higher debt on borrowing costs is shared across all members.
All results on the ranking of debt across different institutional regimes obtained in the
benchmark model continue to hold in the extended model with contagion.
While creating a new class of fiscal institutions might seem like an exotic remedy
for the Eurozone crisis, we feel our analysis provides grounds for optimism, because it
highlights a clear formula for political feasibility. Member states with precarious debt
levels would benefit from a European system to prevent speculative attacks. Mem-
ber states with strong finances fear providing this sort of guarantee precisely because
they worry that it would allow weaker members to continue running excessive budget
deficits. Therefore, a quid pro quo in which the ECB stops speculative attacks only for
countries that have adopted a truly credible budget balance regime appears politically
viable. The crucial point is that the fiscal regime must be solid enough to convince
core members that moral hazard has been eliminated. It is hard to see how any kind
of promise to follow a rule in all future circumstances, or how even the most savage
short-term austerity program, can really convince core members that moral hazard is
absent. This is why endowing an EU institution with instruments that give executive
control over national debt could prove to be the key to longer-term Eurozone survival.7
7See de Blas (7 June 2012, VoxEU) for details on institutional implementation.
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1.1 Related literature
Economists have long emphasized the fiscal challenges implied by joining a monetary
union. Mundell (1961) argued that if a country gives up monetary independence,
it needs countercyclical fiscal policy to offset the amplified effects of asymmetric de-
mand shocks. More recent analyses focus on a more dramatic form of instability: by
giving up their ability to emit currency independently, member states (like emerging
economies that suffer from “original sin”) become vulnerable to speculative attacks on
their sovereign debt (Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998); De Grauwe (2012)). Moreover,
this limits their ability to act as lenders of last resort for their domestic banks, so
troubles in the public and banking sectors become mutually reinforcing (Bruche and
Suarez (2010); Pisani-Ferry (2012)). The literature on monetary and fiscal interactions
(e.g. Leeper (1991); Sims (2013)) also points to the fragility of monetary unions: the
set of monetary and fiscal rules consistent with solvency and equilibrium determinacy
is likely to be reduced by joining a monetary union (Bergin (1998); Sims (1999); Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2011)). Another indication of fiscal vulnerabilities in a monetary
union comes from the literature on deficit bias. While Dixit and Lambertini (2003)
constructed an example in which joining a monetary union has no effect on policy
outcomes if all policy makers have identical objective functions, many other authors
argue that monetary union increases deficit bias when policy makers’ preferences differ
in plausible ways (Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999); Buti, Roeger, and In’t Veld (2001);
Beetsma and Jensen (2005); Chari and Kehoe (2007)).
Like inflation bias, deficit bias arises when policy makers are excessively impatient or
have incentives to break past promises; thus it is natural to ask whether Rogoff’s (1985)
proposal to combat inflation bias through policy delegation might also apply to deficit
bias. Like Rogoff, we model institutional differences parsimoniously by assuming differ-
ent weight parameters in their objective functions. First, we assume democratic politics
makes elected policy makers impatient (relative to society). This reflects widespread
findings in the political economy literature: for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
show how alternating parties of opposing ideology may act impatiently, while Battaglini
(2011) shows how impatience may vary with the debt level, implying mean-reverting
dynamics like those of our extended model of Sec. 4. Second, we model the effects of a
policy mandate by placing extra weight on the mandated objective in the institution’s
preferences (relative to society).8 For a simple and quantifiable objective, this seems
8Adam and Billi (2008) show, in a microfounded New Keynesian model, that the benefits of
“conservative” central banking extend to an economy with endogenous fiscal policy. Their model
shares some features with ours: they assume that the central bank’s preferences reflect those of
society, but place additional weight on inflation stabilization; and they consider the Markov perfect
equilibria of a simultaneous game between monetary and fiscal policy makers, under discretion.
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reasonable; central banks mandated to achieve low inflation do indeed appear to attach
great importance to this objective.9 Persson and Tabellini (1993) argue that central
banks might achieve better macroeconomic stabilization (and higher social welfare) if
they had more complex objectives in their mandates (or preferences). The tradeoff
between simple and complex objectives is an interesting issue, but probably requires
a deeper model of the effects of the mandate on institutions’ decisions. For the cur-
rent paper, which focuses on how systematic biases are affected by policy delegation,
Rogoff’s reduced-form approach provides useful insights.
Since the 1990s, as inflation fell and public debts grew in developed economies, many
economists have suggested delegating some fiscal responsibilities to an institution inde-
pendent of the government (see Debrun, Hauner, and Kumar (2009); Hagemann (2010);
and Costain and de Blas (2012a) for surveys), though few of these proposals have been
based on formal models. The literature distinguishes fiscal councils— which monitor
but do not implement fiscal policy actions— from independent fiscal authorities (IFAs),
which would make some of the fiscal decisions currently taken by the government. Fis-
cal councils are widespread today, and are mandated by recent European reforms,10 but
IFAs remain hypothetical. Two main types of IFA have been proposed. On one hand,
the IFA might set a deficit target, at the start of the annual budget cycle, which the
government is bound to respect; alternatively, it might exercise executive control over
some fiscal instrument with a strong budgetary impact.11 Some papers (see Hagemann
(2010), Sec. II.C; or Calmfors (2011), Sec. 1) take the nonexistence of IFAs today as
evidence of their inviability, arguing that delegation is less appropriate for fiscal than
for monetary policy since fiscal decisions are multidimensional, complex, and political.
However, the validity of this claim depends on which fiscal decisions are considered
(Alesina and Tabellini (2007) and Eggertsson and Borgne (2010) discuss what kinds of
decisions are appropriate to delegate from politicians to unelected technocrats). Our
model stresses the multidimensionality of fiscal policy, and envisions the delegation
of a single, quantitative decision to the IFA: the choice of the current deficit. This
9Alesina and Tabellini (2007) show that this may reflect the career concerns of the technically-
skilled bureaucrats who lead them.
10See the “Fiscal Compact” treaty, European Council (2012). In accord with the treaty, the Spanish
government proposed legislation in June 2013 to establish a fiscal monitoring council; see Europa Press
(28 June 2013).
11Proposals in the first class include von Hagen and Harden (1995); Eichengreen, Hausmann, and
von Hagen (1999); and Wyplosz (2005); those in the second class include Ball (1996); Gruen (1997);
Seidman and Lewis (2002); Wren-Lewis (2002); and Costain and de Blas (2012a). Calmfors (2003)
considers proposals of both types.
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leaves the allocation of spending across different types of services (involving political
and distributional choices) within the democratic process.
In contrast, many high-profile calls for European monetary mechanisms to prevent
speculative attacks have assumed that this requires moves towards full political in-
tegration in Europe; see for example De Grauwe (2012), Soros (10 April 2013), and
Pisani-Ferry (2012). We agree that fiscal reforms are essential to backstop an enhanced
monetary policy, but we argue that the necessary reforms are much more limited than
is commonly supposed. What is essential is that European authorities have the ability
to ensure long-run national budget balance, and for this it suffices that they control at
least one fiscal instrument of sufficient power in each member state. In accord with the
principle of subsidiarity, the remaining fiscal decisions can remain at the national level.
Sims (September 20, 2012) has likewise stressed that fiscal discipline requires delegat-
ing from national governments to Europe some instrument with a strong impact on
each national budget, but that further fiscal integration is neither necessary nor likely
to prove politically feasible. Similarly, some limited European tax powers form an es-
sential backstop for the Schoenmaker and Gros (2012) framework for banking union,
but further fiscal integration is not required for their proposal.
2 The economic environment
The economic environment follows Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999, BB99) closely, but
is generalized to an arbitrary horizon T . Their paper, like Rogoff (1985) and Barro
and Gordon (1983), is built around a reduced-form model of the macroeconomy. Our
paper does not aim to explain the imperfections in public institutions’ decisions, such
as excessive impatience or deficit bias, which have been discussed extensively in the
political economy literature. Instead, our purpose is to build a model that incorporates
these features in a parsimonious way, in order to study how equilibrium outcomes differ
across games in which policy variables are controlled by different sets of institutions.
Our stripped-down model permits a detailed, analytical comparison of perfect foresight
equilibria across different policy regimes, to reveal how systematic policy biases are
damped or enhanced by different institutional configurations.12
12Our decision to study systematic biases analytically in a reduced-form model implies that we do
not address the stabilization of shocks. Addressing optimal stabilization raises important additional
issues that are likely to require further microfoundations. These include the tradeoff between simple
and complex institutional objectives (Persson and Tabellini (1993)), and incentives that affect the
optimal speed of response to shocks, such as the impact of taxes on competitiveness in a monetary
union (Leith and Wren-Lewis (2011)).
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Time is discrete; we consider both finite- and infinite-horizon models. Several re-
gions j ∈ {1, 2, ...J} each benefit from local public spending, and face region-specific
budget constraints. These regions might be considered nations, or subnational areas.
Together, they form a monetary union, in which a single inflation rate applies.
2.1 Social welfare and budget constraints
Let time t private-sector output in country j be xj,t. We distinguish actual private
output from its target value x˜j,t (the bliss point). Our main assumption about the
macroeconomy is that actual output rises if inflation πt is higher than expected infla-
tion, πet , and that it falls with tax distortions τj,t:
xj,t = ν(πt − πet − τj,t). (1)
Social welfare decreases quadratically as output, inflation, and government services
gj,t deviate from their target values. The target level of inflation is assumed to be zero.
The loss function for region j is13
LSj =
T∑
t=0
βtS
{
απSπ
2
t + (xj,t − x˜j,t)2 + αgS (gj,t − g˜j,t)2 .
}
(2)
Here g˜j,t is the target level for government spending, and απS > 0 and αgS > 0
are weights representing the relative importance of deviations of inflation and public
services from their targets; without loss of generality the weight on output deviations
is set equal to one. The discount factor for social welfare is βS ≡ 11+ρS < 1.
Since we are modeling a set of independent states that lack consensus for full polit-
ical integration, we assume that policy is constrained by a budget constraint for each
region. This takes the form
dj,t = Rdj,t−1 + p
g
j,tgj,t − τj,t − κπt, (3)
where dj,t is the real debt of region j at the end of period t (which must be paid off
at time t + 1). Our assumption that seignorage revenues κπt are linear in inflation,
independent of the debt level, effectively means that government bonds are issued in
real terms. If bonds were nominal, seignorage would also include a term proportional
to the product of inflation and debt. We make this assumption about seignorage
revenues for analytical convenience only; by optimizing a quadratic objective under
13Alesina and Tabellini (1987) derive an output relation of the form (1) from a more complete
model. Also, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2011) derive a social welfare function of the form (2) from a
standard New Keynesian framework in which government spending enters the utility function.
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linear constraints we can solve the model explicitly. But allowing for nominal debt
would only strengthen our results, since it would increase the gains from surprise
inflation, and thereby reinforce both the inflation and deficit biases in our model.
Note also that the real interest rate r is assumed constant, since quadratic pref-
erences imply certainty equivalence, so that R ≡ 1 + r represents the inverse of the
time-preference factor of the savers in the economy. Therefore, we impose the param-
eter restriction βSR = 1. Furthermore, if T is finite, then there is a final constraint
dj,T = 0 (4)
which simply says that the economy ends at time T , and therefore markets are unwilling
to make loans at T , since these loans will not be paid back. In an infinite-horizon
context, debt must instead respect the following “no-Ponzi” condition:
lim
t→∞
dj,t
Rt
≤ 0, (5)
which says that interest payments on debt are sufficient to make it worthwhile for the
private sector (with discount rate R−1) to hold the bonds.
Total public services in region j, gj,t, are a constant-elasticity aggregate of a variety
of differentiated services gj,k,t:
gj,t =
(∫ 1
0
ωj,k,t (gj,k,t)
η−1
η dk
) η
η−1
. (6)
where the ωj,k,t > 0 are weights on the different services k. Spending in region j is
financed by taxes in that region, τj,t, and by a share of seignorage revenues κπt. Total
government spending is a sum over all public goods,
∫ 1
0
gj,k,tdk. Spending is allocated
to minimize the cost of the public aggregate provided:
pgj,tgj,t ≡
min
{gj,k,t}1k=0
∫ 1
0
gj,k,tdk s.t.
(∫ 1
0
ωj,k,t (gj,k,t)
η−1
η dk
) η
η−1
≥ gj,t (7)
Equation (7) serves to define the price of government services, pgj,t. We assume that
ωj,k,t is independently and identically distributed for all j, k, and t.
We consider two possible scenarios for the public spending decision. On one hand,
the policy maker that allocates public spending may know the distribution of ωj,k,t,
but not observe its realization. Then it is optimal to allocate spending equally across
all goods, so that
pgj,t = q
H ≡ Eω
η
η−1
j,k,t .
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At the opposite extreme, the policy maker may observe wj,k,t before choosing gj,k,t.
In this case, it is optimal to allocate more spending to the most-demanded services,
according to the first-order condition
gj,k,t
gj,l,t
=
(
ωj,k,t
ωj,l,t
)η
This more efficient allocation makes aggregate public services less expensive:
pgj,t = q
L < qH .
2.2 An omniscient, committed, cooperative Pareto planner
Given these objectives and constraints, we next establish a welfare benchmark for
our model. For relevance in the European context, we consider a Ramsey planner
who maximizes social welfare taking market equilibrium conditions and region-specific
budget constraints as given. Our planner does not represent any existing European
institution, as it has unrealistic advantages in information and decision-making, but it
represents a benchmark against which hypothetical institutions can be compared. For
this purpose, we study an omniscient, committed, cooperative Pareto planner :
• Omniscient : the planner observes ωj,k,t before choosing gj,k,t. This makes aggre-
gate public spending relatively inexpensive: pgj,t = q
L.
• Commited : the planner can credibly commit to choose the inflation rate it has
previously announced. Therefore the inflation rate chosen by the planner is the
rate expected by the public: πt = π
e
t .
• Cooperative: the planner chooses the policy variables for all regions j ∈ {1, ..., J},
and thus internalizes any externalities across borders.
• Pareto: the planner obeys a distinct budget constraint for each region, maximiz-
ing social welfare insofar as this does not require transfers across regions.
We write the planner’s value function as VP,t, the maximized value of −LSj, summed
across all regions j. The value attainable depends on the debt levels of the regions,
according to the following Bellman equation:
VP,t
({dj,t−1}Jj=1) = maxπt, {dj,t, τj,t}Jj=1
−1
2
{
απSπ
2
t +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
(ντj,t + x˜j,t)
2
+ αgS
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt
qL
− g˜j,t
)2]}
+ βSVP,t+1
({dj,t}Jj=1) . (8)
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The first-order conditions for inflation and for region-j taxes are
απSπt +
1
J
J∑
j=1
καgS
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) = 0, (9)
ν (ντj,t + x˜j,t) +
αgS
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) = 0. (10)
At time T < ∞, the planner must obey the terminal condition (4), or if T = ∞ then
debt must satisfy (5). In all previous periods t < T , dj,t is chosen to satisfy
− 1
J
αgS
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) + βS ∂VP,t+1
∂dj,t
({dk,t}Jk=1) = 0. (11)
We can then use an envelope condition:
∂VP,t
∂dj,t−1
({dk,t−1}Jk=1) = 1J RαgSqL (gj,t − g˜j,t), (12)
to obtain an Euler equation for government spending in each region:
gj,t − g˜j,t = βSR(gj,t+1 − g˜j,t+1). (13)
Finally, the planner’s choices of taxes τj,t and debt dj,t determine current public services
gj,t through the period budget constraint:
dj,t = Rdj,t−1 + qLgj,t − τj,t − κπt. (14)
Two intratemporal properties of the planner’s solution are easily seen from the
first-order conditions. For each period and region, there is a fixed linear relationship
between output and public spending:
νxˆj,t =
αgS
qL
gˆj,t, (15)
where xˆj,t = xj,t − x˜j,t and gˆj,t = gj,t − g˜j,t and are the deviations of output and public
spending from their bliss points. There is also a constant linear relation between
inflation and average public spending:
απSπt = −καgS
qL
¯ˆgt, (16)
where ¯ˆgt = J
−1∑
j gˆj,t. Thus, inflation is positive as long as government spending is
below its bliss point, on average across countries.
Rewriting the Euler equation in terms of inflation, and plugging the within-period
relations (15)-(16) into the constraint (14), we obtain a simple difference equation
governing the aggregate dynamics of the planner’s problem:(
d¯t
πt+1
)
=
(
R −κ˜P
0 1
βSR
)(
d¯t−1
πt
)
+
(
1
0
)
¯˜zt, (17)
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where d¯t = J
−1∑
j dj,t,
¯˜zt = J
−1∑
j(xˆj,t/ν + qLgˆj,t), and
κ˜P = κ+
απS
καgS
(
q2L +
αgS
ν2
)
(18)
If ¯˜z is constant, then the dynamics (17) have a steady state at zero inflation with
d¯ss = −
¯˜z
r
. (19)
At this steady state, assets are so high (debt is so negative) that the bliss points of
output and public spending are affordable with interest earnings alone. The eigenvalues
around this steady state are R and (βSR)
−1. Assuming that the second eigenvalue is
one, the system is saddle-path stable, and therefore has a unique equilibrium.
We can then summarize perfect foresight equilibrium behavior as follows.
• In an infinite horizon context, assuming βSR = 1, d¯SS is not the only steady
state. Instead, any debt level is a steady state (both in aggregate, and for each
region j separately).14 Debt is held constant by setting a constant inflation rate
π = (¯˜z + rd¯)/κP , thus smoothing seignorage distortions over time. (Likewise,
distortions in output and spending are smoothed over time in each country, at a
level consistent with unchanging debt.)
• In a finite horizon context, assuming βSR = 1, the planner smoothes seignorage
distortions over time by setting a constant inflation rate π. Inflation is chosen so
that aggregate debt hits zero at time T , d¯T = 0, given the aggregate constraint
d¯t = Rd¯t−1 − κ˜Pπ + ¯˜z. The required inflation rate is
π =
1
κ˜P
(
¯˜z +
RT+1
RT+1 − 1rd¯−1
)
.
(Likewise, distortions in output and spending are smoothed over time in each
country, at a level consistent with dj,T = 0 for all j.)
3 Policy games
3.1 Policy makers’ objectives
Next, we consider equilibria in which several policy makers interact. Each one acts
to minimize a loss function that resembles (2), but they may have different discount
factors or different weighting coefficients on the loss terms.
14The existence of a continuum of steady states (or a random walk) for optimal debt is a standard
finding; see for example Benigno and Woodford (2003).
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First, there is a central bank C, which chooses inflation for the whole monetary
union. The bank sums losses symmetrically across all J regions:
LC =
T∑
t=0
βtC
{
JαπCπ
2
t +
J∑
j=1
[
(xj,t − x˜j,t)2 + αgC (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
]}
. (20)
Second, each region j has a government Gj which chooses each type of public spending
gj,k,t, and thereby chooses aggregate public spending gj,t. It may also be responsible
for choosing the tax rate, depending on the institutional scenario considered. The
government’s loss function LGj only reflects terms involving region j:
LGj =
T∑
t=0
βtG
{
απGπ
2
t + (xj,t − x˜j,t)2 + αgG (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
}
. (21)
Third, we consider the possibility of a debt-averse fiscal authority. The fiscal au-
thority may be established by and for region j, in which case we will call it Fj, or it
may be a union-wide institution, in which case we will call it F . A regional authority
Fj is assumed to care only about regional variables, having the loss function
LFj =
T∑
t=0
βtF
{
απFπ
2
t + αdF
(
dj,t − d˜j,t
)2
+ (xj,t − x˜j,t)2 + αgF (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
}
. (22)
This authority cares about the same terms as the society and government of region j,
but it also cares about the region’s real debt dj,t, suffering a loss if debt deviates from its
target value d˜j,t. The level of the target plays little role in the analysis, so we simply set
d˜j,t = 0. A debt term in the fiscal authority’s preferences is consistent with a mandate
for long-run budget balance, since respecting an intertemporal budget constraint means
that real debt cannot be too explosive. In contrast, the intertemporal budget constraint
says little about the time path of the deficit; indeed, optimal taxation theory highlights
the role of the deficit as a shock absorber, which may fluctuate strongly in order to
allow other, distorting instruments to be smoothed.
Alternatively, if there is a single union-wide fiscal authority, we assume that it sums
losses symmetrically across all regions:
LF =
T∑
t=0
βtF
{
JαπFπ
2
t +
J∑
j=1
[
αdF
(
dj,t − d˜j,t
)2
+ (xj,t − x˜j,t)2 + αgF (gj,t − g˜j,t)2
]}
(23)
Note that this function includes a separate term for each region’s debt, reflecting a
concern for budget balance in each individual region, above and beyond its concern for
union-wide budget balance. In other words, the fiscal authority is “Paretian”, like the
OCCPP planner.
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Table 1: Baseline parameter assumptions
Society Central Government Fiscal
and planner bank authority
Discount factor βi 0 < βS < 1 βC = βS 0 < βG < βS βG < βF ≤ βS
βSR = 1
Spending coefficient αgi αgS > 0 αgC = αgS αgG = αgS αgF = αgS
Inflation coefficient απi απS > 0 απC > απS απG = απS απF = απS
Debt coefficient αdi αdS = 0 αdC = 0 αdG = 0 αdF > 0
Coefficients of loss functions for agents i ∈ {S,C,G, F} .
3.1.1 Parameter assumptions
All these policy-making institutions are essentially benevolent, valuing the same goals
as society and the planner. However, their different roles may imply some differences
in priorities, reflected in the coefficients shown in Table 1. The central bank C and
the fiscal authority F have the same degree of patience as society, but the government
may be more impatient, due to the short time horizons of electoral politics. This is one
reason why the government’s decisions may exhibit deficit bias. All three institutions
i ∈ {C,G, F} value public spending to the same degree that society does. But the
central bank is assumed to have a mandate to achieve a target inflation rate; it therefore
weighs losses from inflation variability more strongly than society does.15 Likewise,
even though the debt level does not directly affect social welfare, we assume that the
fiscal authority has a mandate to stabilize debt around some target level, and that this
is reflected in its preferences. Therefore we include a positive coefficient on deviations
of debt from target in its objective function.
By themselves, the baseline parameter assumptions stated in Table 1 do not guaran-
tee the existence of an equilibrium with intuitively reasonable properties. This requires
some additional conditions.
• We say that governments exhibit moderate impatience when the discount rate
satisfies the following inequality:
βGR
2 > 1. (24)
We will assume throughout that (24) holds, because otherwise the government’s
value function from (27) is unbounded in an infinite horizon context. In other
15Alesina and Tabellini (2007) discuss why society may prefer to delegate tasks with quantitative,
verifiable objectives to bureaucrats, instead of leaving them up to the democratic government.
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words, regardless of any other general equilibrium interactions, if (24) is not
satisfied, then the government’s partial equilibrium decision problem is not well
defined for the T = ∞ case.
• We say that the central bank exhibits moderate inflation aversion when its pref-
erences satisfy the following inequality:
απC <
1 + κ
κ
απS. (25)
Throughout Sec. 3, we will assume that (25) holds, because it is central to the
common pool problem of BB99, on which we base our model. As in Chari and
Kehoe (2007), governments anticipate that the central bank will adjust inflation
in response to their debt choices. If inflation rises more than is optimal when
debt increases (which is what moderate inflation aversion implies) then a single
government will hold down its debt in order to avoid the central bank’s inefficient
reaction; but as J → ∞ this effect disappears, since each government regards its
own debt as negligible. We build on this particular common pool problem for
simplicity, and for consistency with BB99. But we will generalize to allow for
another version of the common pool problem in Section 4.
3.2 The game of BB99
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) assume that in period t, the central bank chooses πt,
while the governments choose τjt and djt. Each government then spends the resources
it has available, as given by the budget constraint (3). Market expectations are deter-
mined at the beginning of the period, rationally anticipating the outcome of the game
between the bank and the governments.
Each policy maker’s value is a function of the state of the economy, which includes
the debt of each region j. We search for an equilibrium in which no other state variable
is needed; that is, we rule out consideration of equilibria with more complex forms of
history dependence, such as reputational effects. We call the central bank’s value
function VC,t. Eliminating xj,t and gj,t using (1) and (3), its Bellman equation is:
VC,t
({dj,t−1}Jj=1) = maxπt −12
{
απCπ
2
t +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
(ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)2
+ αgC
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt
qL
− g˜j,t
)2]}
+ βCVC,t+1
({dj,t}Jj=1) (26)
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Since policy makers cannot commit, this problem distinguishes between actual inflation
πt and expected inflation π
e
t . Government j’s value VGj,t is governed by a similar
Bellman equation, which determines taxes and debt for country j:
VGj,t
({dk,t−1}Jk=1) = maxτj,t, dj,t −12
{
απGπ
2
t + (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)2
+ αgG
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt
qL
− g˜j,t
)2}
+ βGVGj,t+1
({dk,t−1}Jk=1) (27)
The first-order condition for the central bank is
απCπt +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
ν (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t) +
καgC
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
]
= 0. (28)
Compared with the social planner’s necessary condition (9), we see an additional term
relating to the central bank’s incentive to set inflation unexpectedly high. Government
j’s optimality condition for taxes is
−ν (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t) +
αgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) = 0. (29)
Like the social planner, the government must obey the terminal budget constraint (4)
or (5). For all periods t < T , government j sets
−αgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) + βG∂VGj,t+1
∂dj,t
({dk,t}Jk=1) = 0. (30)
Its choices of taxes τj,t and debt dj,t then determine current spending gj,t according to
the period budget constraint:
dj,t = qLgj,t +Rdj,t−1 − τj,t − κπt. (31)
The presence of multiple policy makers of non-negligible size implies extra terms in
the value derivative in (30) which do not appear in the planner’s derivative (12). To
compute this derivative, we can ignore how dj,t impacts τj,t+1 and dj,t+1; these effects
have zero marginal value, by the envelope theorem. But we cannot ignore the fact
that changing dj,t will alter the central bank’s choice of πt+1, and other regions’ debt
choices dk,t+1, for k = j; these interactions alter the marginal value of changing dj,t.
Differentiating (27), we obtain:
∂VGj,t
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)−
(
απGπt +
καgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
)
∂πt
∂dj,t−1
+βG
∑
k =j
∂VGj,t+1
∂dk,t
∂dk,t
∂dj,t−1
.
(32)
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Note that we do not need to track how πet varies with dj,t−1. Any change in π
e
t will
cancel with a corresponding change in πt, since under rational expectations π
e
t = πt for
any value of dj,t−1.16 Next, yet another derivative appears in (32): the marginal effect
∂VGj,t+1
∂dk,t
of region k’s debt on government j’s value. Differentiating (27) again yields:
∂VGj,t
∂dk,t−1
= −
(
απGπt +
καgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
)
∂πt
∂dk,t−1
+ βG
∑
l =j
∂VGj,t+1
∂dl,t
∂dl,t
∂dk,t−1
. (33)
Equations (28)-(29) are purely intratemporal, so they can be jointly simplified.
Assuming αgG = αgS, the relation between output and spending is the same as in the
social planner’s problem:
νxˆj,t =
αgG
qL
gˆj,t. (34)
Plugging (34) into (28), we can then calculate inflation in terms of the average deviation
of public spending from its bliss point:
απCπt = −
(
αgG + καgC
qL
)
¯ˆgt (35)
Comparing with the planner’s first-order condition (16), the right-hand side of (35)
contains an extra term reflecting the incentive for surprise inflation. On the other hand,
a high inflation aversion coefficient on the left-hand side tends to restrain inflation. We
can summarize the tradeoff between these two effects as follows:
• Under the baseline parameterization of Table 1, and assuming that the central
bank displaysmoderate inflation aversion, the BB99 equilibrium exhibits a higher
ratio of inflation to public spending distortions than the planner’s solution does.
3.2.1 Solution when J = ∞
Using the fact that value functions should be quadratic, and policy functions linear,
the model can be computed backwards for any J . But the solution is especially simple
if J = ∞ or if J = 1. First, neither inflation nor other regions’ debt will respond to
region j’s debt if region j is negligibly small. So when J = ∞, (32) simplifies to
∂VGj,t
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) . (36)
Then, using (30) and (35), inflation obeys a very simple Euler equation:
πt = βGRπt+1. (37)
16Recall that, as in BB99, πet represents an expectation at the beginning of t, after time t−1 choices
and time t shocks have been revealed.
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Summing debt across regions, the matrix dynamics of the model are(
d¯t
πt+1
)
=
(
R −κ˜
0 1
βGR
)(
d¯t−1
πt
)
+
(
1
0
)
¯˜zt, (38)
where d¯t and ¯˜zt were defined earlier, and
κ˜ ≡ κ+
(
q2L +
αgG
ν2
) απC
αgG + καgC
. (39)
Notice:
• Assuming βG < βS, inflation grows faster in the BB99 economy than it does in
the OCCPP planning solution.
• Under the baseline parameterization of Table 1, κ˜P > κ˜ if and only if the central
bank exhibits moderate inflation aversion.
Both of these observations point to overaccumulation of debt in the BB99 economy.
First, faster inflation growth due to greater impatience means less inflationary financing
in the short run than in the long run, consistent with a short-run debt build-up, to be
paid off in the long run. Second, κ˜P > κ˜ shows that for any current pair (dt−1, πt),
if πt > 0, then the resulting debt level dt is lower in the social planner’s solution
than in the BB99 economy. This second effect, as we emphasized above, relies on the
assumption that the inflation aversion of the central bank is lower than optimal. As in
Chari and Kehoe (2007), this aspect of deficit bias is a side-effect of inflation bias.
Now, assuming ¯˜z is constant, these dynamics have the same steady state as the
social planner’s problem does, with zero inflation and debt level d¯ss = − ¯˜zr . The
dynamics around the steady state are governed by the eigenvalues R and (βGR)
−1,
which are both explosive. Therefore,
• In an infinite horizon context, no perfect foresight equilibrium with nonzero
bondholdings exists. With one predetermined variable (debt) and one jump vari-
able (inflation), existence of a (unique) infinite-horizon equilibrium would require
one stable and one unstable eigenvalue. Intuitively, the impatience of the govern-
ment is inconsistent with the discount rate of the bondholders in this economy,
so there is no infinite-horizon equilibrium in which the government’s debt is held.
• In a finite horizon context, inflation explodes at a constant rate over time, as
do output and spending distortions. That is, the impatient government chooses
low distortions initially; to pay off the resulting stock of debt, over time it must
increase inflation and taxes, while decreasing public services. The initial inflation
rate is chosen so that aggregate debt hits zero at time T , d¯T = 0, given the
aggregate dynamics d¯t = Rd¯t−1 − κ˜π + ¯˜z.
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Focusing on constant ¯˜zt is reasonable, since our paper seeks to analyze systematic
deficit bias. When ¯˜zt is constant, we can show that the initial buildup of debt is
excessive, compared with the planner’s solution (see the appendix for the proof):
Proposition 1. Suppose T < ∞, J = ∞, βG < βS, and ¯˜zt = ¯˜z is
a constant. Then, starting from the same positive initial debt level
d−1 > 0, debt will be strictly higher at all times t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1} in
the BB99 model than it is in the OCCPP planning solution.
3.2.2 Solution when J = 1
It is also relatively simple to analyze the case of a single region, J = 1. This case
is informative, since by comparing J = 1 with J = ∞ while holding other factors
fixed, we see the effects of joining a large monetary union. With only one region under
consideration, the last term of equation (32) drops out, and so (33) is not needed. We
can then derive the following Euler equation for public spending:
αgG
qL
gˆt = βGR
αgG
qL
gˆt+1 − βG
(
απGπt+1 +
καgG
qL
gˆt+1
)
∂πt+1
∂dt
. (40)
(The index j is suppressed here, since now there is only one region.) Using (35), we
can restate (40) in terms of inflation only:
πt = βG
(
R + γ
∂πt+1
∂dt
)
πt+1. (41)
where
γ = κ
(
απG
απC
(
αgG + καgC
καgG
)
− 1
)
. (42)
We observe:
• Suppose the baseline parameter assumptions of Table 1 hold. Then γ < 1, and
γ > 0 if and only if the central bank displays moderate inflation aversion.
The matrix dynamics of the model are summarized by a system very similar to
those seen previously:(
dt
πt+1
)
=
(
R −κ˜
0
[
βG
(
R + γ ∂πt+1
∂dt
)]−1
)(
dt−1
πt
)
+
(
1
0
)
z˜t. (43)
Notice that moderate inflation aversion (γ > 0) will make inflation grow more slowly
for J = 1 than for J = ∞ as long as the central bank increases inflation in response
to greater debt (∂πt+1
∂dt
> 0). Now, note that in this linear-quadratic model all control
variables should be linear functions of the states; and in particular, in an infinite-
horizon context ∂πt+1
∂dt
will simply be a constant. Lemma 1 states that moderate inflation
aversion suffices, but is not actually necessary, for this derivative to be positive.
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Lemma 1. Suppose −κ
2
< γ. Then in any finite- or infinite-horizon perfect
foresight equilibrium of the BB99 game with J = 1, the response of
inflation to debt ∂πt+1
∂dt
is positive at all times.
Given these results, we can now conclude that under moderate inflation aversion,
the model with a single region has lower inflation growth than the model with J = ∞.
Since the κ˜ term is the same in the J = 1 and the J = ∞ cases, the high inflation
growth of the J = ∞ case is associated with lower initial inflation, and higher final
inflation, and therefore implies that debt initially accumulates, to be paid off later
when inflation is high. Therefore:17
Proposition 2. Suppose βG < βS. Then:
(a.) A perfect foresight equilibrium exists when J = 1 if T < ∞ or if γ is
sufficiently large.
(b.) Suppose T < ∞, and that the central bank exhibits moderate in-
flation aversion. Then, starting from the same positive per capita
debt level d−1 > 0, per capita debt will be strictly higher at all times
t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1} if J = ∞ than it would be if J = 1.
In other words, under moderate inflation aversion, a single region is less subject to
deficit bias than a monetary union (large J). This difference is illustrated for a finite-
horizon numerical example assuming “moderate impatience” and “moderate inflation
aversion”18, comparing J = 1 with J = 20, in Figure 1. We see that inflation, gov-
ernment services, and output vary less over time in the J = 1 economy, and that debt
declines roughly monotonically to zero by time T . In contrast, with J = 20, inflation
rises steadily with time, as a debt burden accumulates and then must eventually be
paid off; meanwhile government services and output decline steadily over time.
3.3 A game with a fiscal authority
Next, we solve a game in which debt is controlled by an independent debt-averse fiscal
authority. The central bank’s Bellman equation is given by (26), as in the BB99 game.
The Bellman equation of government j is identical to (27), except that now the only
17Result analogous to Prop. 2(b) are reported in the BB99 paper.
18The parameter values used in the numerical results are: βS = 0.96, R = 1/βS , ν = 1.94, q = 1,
βG = 0.99βS , αgC = αgG = απG = 1, απC = 2 ∗ απG, x˜ = −30, g˜ = 100, d0 = 100 and d20 = 0.
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Figure 1: Example: effects of monetary union.
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Note. Dynamic simulation, 20 periods, comparing BB99 equilibrium for a single region (J = 1), with
equilibrium for a monetary union with 20 members.
choice variable is τjt. A fiscal authority in region j would be described by the following
Bellman equation:
VFj,t
({dk,t−1}Jk=1) = maxdj,t −12
{
απFπ
2
t + αdFd
2
j,t + (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)2
+ αgF
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt
qL
− g˜j,t
)2}
+ βFVFj,t+1
({dk,t}Jk=1) (44)
Alternatively, a fiscal authority for the union as a whole would be described by:
VF,t
({dj,t−1}Jj=1) = max{dj,t}Jj=1
−1
2
{
απFπ
2
t +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
αdFd
2
j,t + (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)2
+ αgF
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + κπt
qL
− g˜j,t
)2]}
+ βFVF,t+1
({dj,t}Jj=1) (45)
As before, the first-order condition for the central bank is
απCπt +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
ν (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t) +
καgC
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
]
= 0, (46)
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and government j’s necessary condition for taxes is
−ν (ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t) +
αgG
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) = 0. (47)
Now suppose the fiscal authority is based in country j. Its terminal debt level must
satisfy the ”no Ponzi condition” (4) or (5) as in the previous models. In all periods
t < T it chooses debt to satisfy
−αgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)− αdFdj,t + βF ∂VFj,t+1
∂dj,t
({dk,t}Jk=1) = 0. (48)
Compared with the model of BB99, we notice that (48) includes a new, debt-related
term, derived from the fiscal authority’s debt aversion. Finally, the government’s tax
decision τj,t and the fiscal authority’s choice of debt dj,t jointly determine current
spending gj,t, via the period budget constraint:
dj,t = qLgj,t +Rdj,t−1 − τj,t − κπt. (49)
Since the players are not infinitesimal, each takes into account how its moves affect
future moves by other players. Thus, the fiscal authority’s marginal value of debt
includes its impact on future inflation and taxes, and on other regions’ future debts:
∂VFj,t
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) +
[
ν(ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)−
αgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
]
∂τj,t
∂dj,t−1
−
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
)
∂πt
∂dj,t−1
+ βF
∑
k =j
∂VFj,t+1
∂dk,t
∂dk,t
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgF
qL
gˆj,t −
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
gˆj,t
)
∂πt
∂dj,t−1
+ βF
∑
k =j
∂VFj,t+1
∂dk,t
∂dk,t
∂dj,t−1
(50)
The terms proportional to ∂τ
∂d
cancel out of (50) using the baseline parameter assump-
tions from Table 1. Specifically, assuming αgG = αgF , they match the terms in the
government’s first-order condition (47), and therefore sum to zero. Evaluating (50)
also requires expressions for some cross derivatives, representing the marginal value to
Fj of region k’s debt, for k = j. Again, the derivatives simplify if αgG = αgF :
∂VFj,t
∂dk,t−1
=
[
ν(ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)−
αgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
]
∂τj,t
∂dk,t−1
−
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
)
∂πt
∂dk,t−1
+ βF
∑
l =j
∂VFj,t+1
∂dl,t
∂dl,t
∂dk,t−1
= −
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
gˆj,t
)
∂πt
∂dk,t−1
+ βF
∑
l =j
∂VFj,t+1
∂dl,t
∂dl,t
∂dk,t−1
. (51)
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If instead the fiscal authority is a union-wide institution, for t < T it sets:
− 1
J
αgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)− 1
J
αdFdj,t + βF
∂VF,t+1
∂dj,t
({dk,t}Jk=1) = 0. (52)
Using (45), the marginal value of country j’s debt is given by
∂VF,t
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgF
qL
1
J
(gj,t − g˜j,t)+ 1
J
J∑
k=1
[
ν(ν(πt − πet − τk,t)− x˜k,t)−
αgF
qL
(gk,t − g˜j,t)
]
∂τj,t
∂dj,t−1
− 1
J
J∑
k=1
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t)
)
∂πt
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgF
JqL
gˆj,t − 1
J
J∑
k=1
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
gˆj,t
)
∂πt
∂dj,t−1
. (53)
Here again, we have used αgG = αgF and (47) to eliminate the
∂τ
∂d
terms. Notice
also that no value function derivatives occur on the right-hand side of (53); they are
eliminated using the envelope theorem.
The intratemporal first-order conditions can be simplified in the same way as in the
BB99 model. Equation (47) becomes
νxˆj,t =
αgG
qL
gˆj,t (54)
which is identical to (34). Likewise, plugging (54) into (46), we obtain:
απCπt = −
(
αgG + καgC
qL
)
¯ˆgt (55)
which is identical to (35).
3.3.1 Solving the FAj game when J = ∞
As in the BB99 model, calculating the value function derivatives generally requires a
numerical solution. But the main results can be seen by considering the limiting case
J = ∞, in which each region is infinitesimal, so neither inflation nor other regions’
debt will respond to region j’s debt. Then the envelope condition (50) simplifies to
∂VFj,t
∂dj,t−1
=
RαgF
qL
(gj,t − g˜j,t) . (56)
Plugging this expression into (48), we obtain an Euler equation for public spending:
αgF
qL
gˆj,t + αdFdj,t = βFR
αgF
qL
gˆj,t+1 (57)
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Averaging across regions, we can write (63) in terms of inflation and average debt:
πt = αdF
(
αgG + καgC
αgFαπC
)
d¯t + βFRπt+1. (58)
Comparing (37) with (58), we see that the fiscal authority has two inflation-inhibiting
effects. First, at dj,t = 0, inflation grows more slowly in the presence of the fiscal
authority if βG < βF , that is, if the government is less patient than the fiscal authority.
Second, for any dj,t > 0 inflation grows more slowly in the presence of the fiscal
authority as long as αdF > 0, that is, if the fiscal authority dislikes debt.
The dynamics can be summarized in matrix form as(
d¯t
πt+1
)
=
(
R −κ˜
−α˜
βF
1+α˜κ˜
βFR
)(
d¯t−1
πt
)
+
(
1
− α˜
βFR
)
¯˜zt, (59)
where
α˜ ≡ αdF
αgF
(
αgG + καgC
απC
)
. (60)
We now summarize some key observations about these dynamics.
Prop. 3. Suppose the baseline parameter assumptions hold, and J = ∞.
(a.) The model with a fiscal authority at the country level behaves exactly
as the BB99 model if βF = βG and αdF = 0.
(b.) If T = ∞ and βFR < 1, then no perfect foresight equilibrium ex-
ists if αdF = 0. A unique perfect foresight equilibrium exists if αdF is
sufficiently large.
(c.) Suppose T < ∞, βF > βG, αdF > 0, and ¯˜zt = ¯˜z is a constant. Then,
starting from the same positive initial debt level d−1 > 0, debt will be
strictly lower at all times t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T −1} in the regime with national
fiscal authorities than it would be in the BB99 model.
Prop. 3(a) points out that separating the choice of taxation and deficits from the
choice of spending has no effect if a local institution choosing taxes and deficits has
preferences identical to the government (because if so, the set of first-order conditions
defining equilibrium is equivalent).
To prove Prop. 3(b), we first show that both eigenvalues of the system (59) are real.
We then show that both eigenvalues are greater than one if αdF = 0, but that one of the
eigenvalues is less than one when αdF is sufficiently large. That is, sufficiently strong
debt aversion by the fiscal authority stabilizes debt dynamics, implying the existence
of a unique equilibrium. The condition for “sufficiently large” is:
αdF >
1
κ˜
(
απCαgF
αgG + καgC
)[
R + βFR− βFR2 − 1
]
. (61)
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Condition (61) reduces to αdF > 0 if we impose βFR = 1, as in Table 1.
Part (c) is proved by relying again on the fact that the equilibrium policy functions
should be linear in debt. For T < ∞, the coefficients of the linear function will change
over time, but they can be calculated by working backwards from the last period T . In
the appendix, we show that if the fiscal authority is less impatient than the government,
and/or exhibits debt aversion, then (starting from a positive debt level) debt always
remains higher in the BB99 economy than it does in the FAj economy.
3.3.2 Solving the FA game
Next, we solve the model with a single fiscal authority at the level of the monetary
union. To solve this case, note that given the linear form of the equilibrium, the
response of inflation to any given country’s debt must be 1/J times its response to
aggregate debt.19 Thus the envelope condition (53) becomes
∂VF,t
∂dj,t−1
= =
1
J
RαgF
qL
gˆj,t −
(
απFπt +
καgF
qL
¯ˆgt
)
1
J
∂πt
∂d¯t−1
, (62)
so that the factor 1/J cancels out of the Euler equation:
αgF
qL
gˆj,t + αdFdj,t = βFR
αgF
qL
gˆj,t+1 − βF
(
απFπt+1 +
καgF
qL
¯ˆgt+1
)
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
. (63)
We observe
• When debt is controlled by a single fiscal authority at the union level, the dy-
namics of the model are independent of the number of regions J .
If we now average over all regions, and substitute π for ¯ˆg, we obtain the Euler
equation in terms of inflation:
πt = βF
(
R + γF
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)
πt+1 + α˜d¯t, (64)
where α˜ was defined in (60), and
γF = κ
(
απF
απC
(
αgG + καgC
καgF
)
− 1
)
. (65)
We observe:
• Suppose the baseline parameter assumptions of Table 1 hold. Then γF = γ =< 1,
and γF > 0 if and only if the central bank displays moderate inflation aversion.
19This simplification would no longer be valid if we allowed for other parameter differences across
regions, other than their initial debt level.
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Writing the dynamics in matrix form, we have
(
d¯t
πt+1
)
=
(
R −κ˜
−Rα˜
βF
(
R+γF
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
) 1+α˜κ˜
βF
(
R+γF
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)
)(
d¯t−1
πt
)
+
(
1
− α˜
βF
(
R+γF
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)
)
¯˜zt.
(66)
This system combines two properties we have seen before. Like a model with fiscal
authorities at the regional level, debt alters the dynamics of inflation, as long as the
fiscal authority is debt averse (α˜ > 0). But in addition, inflation growth is affected
by the term γF
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
, as in the BB99 model of a single region. This term is positive,
slowing down inflation growth, if the central bank exhibits moderate inflation aversion
and chooses ∂πt+1
∂d¯t
> 0. Lemma 2 shows that inflation responds positively to debt in
the FA model under the same condition that applied to the BB99, J = 1 model.
Lemma 2. Suppose −κ
2
< γ. Then in any finite- or infinite-horizon perfect
foresight equilibrium of the FA game, the response of inflation to debt
∂πt+1
∂dt
is positive at all times.
Inflation growth is also slowed down, relative to the BB99 baseline model, by the
higher discount factor βF > βG. We summarize some key observations about system
(66) as follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose the baseline parameter assumptions hold.
(a.) The model with a single fiscal authority at the union level behaves
exactly as the BB99 model with J = 1 if βF = βG and αdF = 0.
(b.) If T = ∞ and βFR ≤ 1, a unique perfect foresight equilibrium exists
if αdF is sufficiently large and/or if γ is sufficiently large.
(c.) Suppose T < ∞, γF > 0, and ¯˜zt = ¯˜z is a constant. Then, fixing βF and
αdF and starting from the same positive initial debt level d−1 > 0, debt
will be strictly lower at all times t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T −1} under a union-wide
fiscal authority than it would be with national fiscal authorities.
Figure 2 shows a finite-horizon numerical example comparing the baseline BB99
scenario (with J = 20, as in Figure 1) and scenarios with regional or centralized fiscal
authorities assuming “moderate impatience” and “moderate inflation aversion”20.
20The parameter values used here are the same ones used in Figure 1. Additionally we set αdF = 0.1
and βF = 0.995βS .
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Figure 2: Example: effects of fiscal authority.
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Note. Dynamic simulation, 20 periods, comparing three policy configurations for a monetary union
with 20 members: baseline BB99 equilibrium, equilibrium with fiscal authorities in each region, and
equilibrium with a single central fiscal authority.
3.4 A game with a federal government
Next, we briefly compare the behavior of an independent fiscal authority solely con-
cerned with budget balance with the behavior of a European federal government that
controls all aspects of fiscal policy. Given our specification of the previous games, it
now makes sense to assume that the budget constraint is
dj,t = Rdj,t−1 + qHgj,t − τj,t − sj,t − κπt. (67)
Government services now cost qH > qL, because taking all fiscal decisions at the union
level implies a loss of local knowledge about spending needs. The budget constraint
also reflects the possibility of transfers sj,t across regions. We could assume that the
government remains “Paretian”, so that regions remain fully responsible for their own
budgets, setting
sj,t = 0 (68)
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for all j. But we could also consider a full “fiscal transfer union”, in which transfers
are constrained only by
J∑
j=1
sj,t = 0. (69)
The central bank’s Bellman equation now becomes:
VC,t
({dj,t−1}Jj=1) = maxπt −12
{
απCπ
2
t +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
(ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)2
+ αgC
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + sj,t + κπt
qH
− g˜j,t
)2]}
+ βCVC,t+1
({dj,t}Jj=1) (70)
The government solves
VG,t
({dj,t−1}Jj=1) = max{dj,t, τj,t, sj,t}Jj=1
−1
2
{
απGπ
2
t +
1
J
J∑
j=1
[
(ν(πt − πet − τj,t)− x˜j,t)2
+ αgG
(
dj,t −Rdj,t−1 + τj,t + sj,t + κπt
qH
− g˜j,t
)2]}
+ βGVG,t+1
({dj,t}Jj=1) (71)
subject either to (68) or (69). Note that (71) is based on the assumption that the
European federal government is democratic. Consistent with our earlier assumptions,
we suppose that electoral politics tends to make the government more impatient than
society as a whole. And since the government must choose between many competing
uses of funds, there is no reason for it to be biased against debt, any more than an
individual region’s government would be.
Given our previous results, it is easy to see how this setup will behave. If the
government is Paretian, in the aggregate it acts just like our previous model of a single
government (with composite preferences) interacting with a single central bank. Thus
the dynamics are analogous to (43), except that they now refer to average debt over
the whole union:
(
d¯t
πt+1
)
=
(
R −κ˜G
0
[
βG
(
R + γ ∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)]−1
)(
d¯t−1
πt
)
+
(
1
0
)
z˜Gt . (72)
where
κ˜G ≡ κ+
(
q2H +
αgG
ν2
) απC
αgG + καgC
, (73)
z˜Gt ≡ qH g˜t +
x˜t
ν
. (74)
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Note that these dynamics are independent of the number of regions, because the federal
government acts as a single decision-maker that internalizes the common pool problem
across regions. This is why the term γ ∂πt+1
∂d¯t
appears in the inflation dynamics, as it does
in the BB99 model with J = 1, slowing down the explosion of inflation by counteracting
the impatience of the government.
A major disadvantage of this setup is the loss of “subsidiarity”: spending decisions
are taken at the union level, where less information is available, and therefore public
services are more expensive than they would be if they were allocated locally. The
relation between inflation, public spending, and output would be
¯ˆgt = −
(
απCqH
αgG + καgC
)
πt, (75)
xˆj,t = −αgG
ν
(
απC
αgG + καgC
)
πt (76)
Comparing with the corresponding relations for the BB99 economy, (34)-(35), which
also apply in the economy with a fiscal authority, (75) and (76) show that the relation
between inflation and output is unchanged, but that for any given level of inflation,
the distance of government services from their bliss point is increased.
We can summarize these observations as follows.
• Like a union-wide fiscal authority, a federal government for the monetary union
would internalize the common pool problem across regions. On the other hand,
the federal government would tend to accumulate more debt insofar as democratic
politics makes it more impatient and less debt averse than the fiscal authority.
• For a given level of inflation, the federal government would achieve the same
level of output, but a lower level of government services, compared with the fiscal
authority (and with the BB99 economy).
Intuitively, three forces restrain debt in the union-wide fiscal authority case: in-
creased patience, debt aversion and elimination of the common-pool problem. In the
federal government case, only the last of these three mechanisms applies. But beyond
the effects on the debt level, the federal government also causes a decrease in the ef-
ficiency of public spending, insofar as less information is available at the centralized
level for correctly allocating spending decisions.
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3.4.1 Fiscal transfer union
If we instead consider a “fiscal transfer union”, in which nonzero transfers across regions
occur, the aggregate dynamics are still given by (72). The only difference is at the
regional level, at which all differences in distortions are eliminated. That is, gˆj,t and
xˆj,t are equalized across all regions, so that the marginal utilities of output and public
spending do not differ with j. This raises the level of social welfare in the aggregate,
but it is not a Pareto improvement: regions with higher debt (or less favorable shocks
g˜j,t or x˜j,t) benefit at the expense of regions with less debt or more favorable shocks,
from whom they receive transfers.21
4 Contagion and the common pool problem
Up to this point, our analysis has been based on a particular form of the budgetary
common pool problem, taken from BB99 and Chari and Kehoe (2007), in which deficit
bias arises only as a side-effect of inflation bias. Conveniently, this resulted in a linear-
quadratic model that we were able to characterize analytically in some detail. But
assuming that the central bank is insufficiently inflation averse does not seem like a
realistic description of the institutional setup in Europe. Therefore, in this section
we introduce a new form of the budgetary common pool problem, based on a more
appealing mechanism: contagion in sovereign bond markets. Realistically, we now
assume that the interest rate on sovereign bonds varies with the debt level. Outside
of a monetary union, we suppose that each country’s sovereign interest rate depends
only on its own debt. Inside a monetary union, we assume contagion increases: each
member state’s interest rate depends on its own debt, but also on the debt levels of the
other members. We model this contagion in the simplest and starkest way by treating
the interest rate throughout the monetary union as a function only of the average debt
level in the union.
This type of interest rate contagion implies a common pool problem in the monetary
union. A country with its own monetary policy would try to avoid debt accumulation,
in order to avoid an increase in the interest rate it pays. But a member of a large
monetary union knows that its debt is only an infinitesimal part of the total, and
therefore has no incentive to restrain its own debt accumulation even though a rise in
the union’s total debt raises interest rates for all. Under this assumption, “moderate
inflation aversion” of the central bank is no longer a necessary condition for inefficient
21Since the transfers sj,t are lump sum, only the present discounted value of transfers is determined
by the model, not the actual time path of transfers.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1311
excess debt in the monetary union. An independent fiscal authority’s restraining effect
on debt is therefore additionally beneficial in this context.
When we build these effects into our model, the optimization problems of the plan-
ner, the central bank, the governments, and the fiscal authority (or authorities) are
identical to those considered in Section 3, except that now the interest rate varies with
debt, instead of being a constant r ≡ R − 1. For a country j with an independent
monetary policy, the interest rate on time t debt dj,t is
rj,t ≡ R(dj,t)− 1, (77)
where R is an increasing function. In a monetary union, the interest rate on all coun-
tries’ debt is instead
rt ≡ R
(
J−1
J∑
j=1
dj,t
)
− 1. (78)
We will impose one weak restriction on debt and interest rates in equilibrium. We
say that the model exhibits extreme dynamic inefficiency if, at the steady-state debt
level dss,
R(dss) +R
′(dss)dss ≤ 1. (79)
This condition cannot hold unless d is sufficiently low, so that d < 0 and/or R < 1; if it
holds, this means assets are so large that saving less in steady state would imply more
interest income in steady state. Since we are focusing our study on economies with
excessive debt, the extreme excess saving implied by (79) is of little interest. Therefore
we simply rule out any parameterization that implies (79).
The first order conditions are analogous to those seen previously. The equation
systems for the planner, for the individual country case (BB99, J = 1), for the monetary
union without a fiscal authority (BB99, J = ∞), for the monetary union with country-
level fiscal authorities (FAj), and for the monetary union with a union-wide fiscal
authority (FA), are as follows.
Social Planner - OCCPP {
d¯t = R(d¯t−1)d¯t−1 − κ˜Pπt + ¯˜z
πt = βS
(
R(d¯t) +R
′d¯t
)
πt+1.
(80)
BB99 - J = 1 {
d¯t = R(d¯t−1)d¯t−1 − κ˜πt + ¯˜z
πt = βG
(
R(d¯t) +R
′d¯t + γ
∂πt+1
∂dt
)
πt+1.
(81)
BB99 - J = ∞ {
d¯t = R(d¯t−1)d¯t−1 − κ˜πt + ¯˜z
πt = βGR(d¯t)πt+1.
(82)
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FAj - J = ∞ {
d¯t = R(d¯t−1)d¯t−1 − κ˜πt + ¯˜z
πt = α˜dt + βFR(d¯t)πt+1.
(83)
FA - J = ∞ {
d¯t = R(d¯t−1)d¯t−1 − κ˜πt + ¯˜z
πt = α˜dt + βF
(
R(d¯t) +R
′d¯t + γ
∂πt+1
∂d¯t
)
πt+1.
(84)
where R′ ≡ ∂R(J
−1∑J
j=1 dj,t)
∂d¯t
. We have not written these systems in matrix form, be-
cause they feature nonlinear interactions between inflation and debt. Using the budget
constraint, it is easy to show the following helpful fact:
Lemma 3. Consider any of the games defined by (80)-(84), and suppose
the model is not extremely dynamically inefficient. Then in any infinite-
horizon perfect foresight equilibrium the response of inflation to debt ∂π
∂d
is positive at any stable steady-state debt level.
Comparing (81) with (82), we now see two distinct common pool problems. A single
government takes account of two effects of debt accumulation. Greater debt gives the
central bank a stronger incentive to create inflation, reflected in the term γ ∂π
∂d
, which
is positive at steady state, given Lemma 3, as long as the central bank is moderately
inflation averse (implying γ > 0). Also, greater debt implies a higher interest rate next
period, reflected in the term R′(d)d > 0. Both of these terms reduce inflation growth.
When there are multiple countries (of equal size), each country’s debt affects average
debt in proportion 1/J , so these terms are scaled down by the factor 1/J . In the limit
as J → ∞, these terms disappear, as we see in (82) and (83). The reduction of these
terms as J increases means that inflation growth increases with J (that is, deficit bias
rises with J), which is how the common pool problem is manifested here. While in the
baseline model there is a common pool problem only when γ > 0, with the additional
effect of interest rate contagion there remains a common pool problem even if γ is zero
or is mildly negative.
As before, the economies with fiscal authorities are equivalent to economies without
fiscal authorities under a particular parameterization. When βF = βG and αdF = 0
(which implies α˜ = 0) the union with country level fiscal authority collapses to the
BB99, J = ∞ case, and the union with union-wide fiscal authority collapse to the
BB99, J = 1 case. Thus, propositions 3(a) and 4(a) continue to hold in the extended
model; and the parameterization under which fiscal authorities are neutral provides
a starting point for analyzing the effects of fiscal authorities under more interesting
parameterizations.
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An advantage of the extended framework with a variable interest rate is that we
no longer need to focus the analysis on a finite-horizon context. When comparing the
regimes in our benchmark model, we focused on the path of debt for T < ∞, since
in many cases an infinite horizon solution did not exist. In the extended framework,
with interest rates that increase with debt, an infinite horizon rational expectations
equilibrium exists for all regimes, even if βG > 0 is arbitrarily small, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003). Therefore we can now focus on infinite-horizon rather than
finite-horizon settings. In particular, our main findings can be seen by just comparing
the steady states of debt and inflation across policy regimes.
To obtain analytical formulas for the steady states of the various models, we now
assume a simple linear interest rate function
R(d¯t) =
1
βS
+ δd¯t (85)
with an intercept term equal to the interest rate that compensates society’s utility dis-
count factor.22. For the first three cases, planner (OCCPP), BB99, J = 1 and BB99,
J = ∞, the steady states of the unique rational expectations dynamics are given in
the following table.
OCCPP BB99, J = 1 BB99, J = ∞
d¯SS 0
1
2δ
(
1
βG
− 1
βS
)
− γ
2δ
∂π
∂d
1
δ
(
1
βG
− 1
βS
)
πSS
¯ˆz
κ˜P
¯ˆz
κ˜
+
(
1
β∗G
− 1
)
d¯SS
κ˜
¯ˆz
κ˜
+
(
1
βG
− 1
)
d¯SS
κ˜
where 1
β∗G
≡ 1
2
(
1
βG
+ 1
βS
− γ ∂π
∂d
)
. Note that moderate inflation aversion (γ > 0) is
sufficient but not necessary for 1
β∗G
< 1
βG
.
G
The debt bias from the additional common pool problem associated with variable
interest rates can be seen by comparing the debt of an independent country with
the average debt in the union. The steady state debt of a single country with an
independent monetary policy (BB99, J = 1) is lower than that in the union (BB99, J =
∞) for two reasons. First, it internalizes the effect of debt on the interest rate, which
decreases steady state debt by 50%.23. Second, as previously discussed, it observes
that its debt might affect inflation and therefore decreases debt further if the central
bank exhibits moderate inflation aversion. This effect is seen in the second term in
the formula for debt in the BB99, J = 1 case. These findings are summarized in the
following results, which extend Props. 1 and 2 to the case of variable interest rates.
22Assuming R(d¯t) =
1
βS
+ δ(d¯t − d¯∗), where d¯∗ is an arbitrary target for debt, does not alter our
qualitative results. Thus, for simplicity, we set the target level to zero.
23This quantitative finding stems from the linearity R(d¯t); note that since R
′ = δ,
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Prop. 5. Suppose interest rates increase with debt according to (85); also,
let T = ∞, J = ∞, and βG < βS. Then steady-state debt is higher in
the BB99 monetary union than it is in the OCCPP planner solution.
Prop. 6. Suppose interest rates increase with debt according to (85); also,
let T = ∞ and βG < βS. Then steady-state debt is higher in a monetary
union with J = ∞ than it is in a single country with an independent
monetary policy if the following condition holds:(
1
βG
− 1
βS
)
+ γ
∂π
∂d
> 0. (86)
Moderate inflation aversion is sufficient but not necessary for (86).
We next consider the effects of introducing fiscal authorities. If J = ∞, and there
is a fiscal authority in each country j, the relevant system (83) can be rewritten as{
d¯SS =
πSS(1−βF /βS)
α˜+βF δπSS
= gFAj(πSS)
πSS =
¯˜z
κ˜
+ d¯SS
κ˜
(
1
βS
− 1 + δd¯SS
)
= f(d¯SS).
(87)
Function f is a parabola which represents the steady-state debt level consistent with
the budget constraint, given steady-state inflation; it is illustrated by the blue curve
in Figure 3. The inflation rate takes its minimum value, πmin = 1
κ˜
(
¯˜z − (1/βs−1)2
4δ
)
,
when debt takes the negative value dmin = 1−1/βS
2δ
< 0. Note that πmin > 0 if and
only if ¯˜z > (1/βS−1)
2
4δ
, which is a weak restriction since ¯˜z is likely to be large. If instead
¯˜z < (1/βS−1)
2
4δ
, then the minimum value of inflation is negative, and the two debt levels
associated with πSS = 0 are both negative.
The function gFAj(πSS) represents the values of inflation and debt consistent with
the steady-state Euler equation. This function is weakly increasing, and can be used
to bound the possible values of debt: as inflation tends to zero, gFAj(πSS) → 0; and
as inflation tends to infinity, gFAj(πSS) → 1δ
(
1
βF
− 1
βS
)
. Note that since βF > βG,
this upper bound is less than the debt level associated with the BB99, J = ∞ case
(see the third column in the previous table). On the other hand, for negative values
of inflation, gFAj(πSS) goes asymptotically to −∞ as πSS → − α˜βF δ . Geometrically, we
conclude that if ¯˜z > (1/βS−1)
2
4δ
or if α˜ is sufficiently large, then f and gFAj have exactly
one crossing.24 This crossing occurs at a point where steady state debt and inflation are
both positive (both strictly positive, if βF < βS; but steady-state debt will be exactly
zero if βF = βS). These observations imply the following comparison across regimes:
24If neither of these conditions is satisfied, then f and g have three crossings, two of which occur at
points where both inflation and debt are negative. These additional steady states seem uninteresting
for our purposes.
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Proposition 7. Suppose interest rates increase with debt according to
(85); also, let T = ∞ and βG < βF < βS. Then if ¯˜z > (1/βS−1)24δ or if α˜
is sufficiently large, there is a unique steady state of the FAj, J = ∞
model, which has less debt than the BB99, J = ∞ model, and (weakly)
more debt than the OCCPP planner’s solution:
0 ≤ d¯FAjSS <
1
δ
(
1
βF
− 1
βS
)
≤ 1
δ
(
1
βG
− 1
βS
)
= d¯BB99SS (88)
The leftmost inequality holds strictly if βF < βS strictly.
This result is an infinite horizon version of Prop. 3(c): fiscal authorities at the country
level decrease debt, bringing the equilibrium closer to the planner’s solution.
If instead there is a single centralized fiscal authority, the relevant system of neces-
sary conditions can be written as{
d¯SS =
πSS(1−βF /βS−βF γ∂π/∂d¯)
α˜+2βF δπSS
= gFA(πSS)
πSS =
¯˜z
κ˜
+ dSS
(
1
βS
− 1 + δdSS
)
= f(dSS).
(89)
We can again bound the steady-state debt level using the function gFA(πSS) as we
did for Prop. 7. Function gFA is weakly increasing; when inflation tends to zero,
gFA(πSS) → 0 and when inflation tends to infinity gFA(πSS) → 12δ
(
1
βF
− 1
βS
− γ∂π
∂d¯
)
.
We must consider two possible cases:
Case 1 If
(
1
βF
− 1
βS
− γ∂π
∂d¯
)
< 0, then when inflation increases, debt approaches its
lower bound (asset accumulation), and since the derivative is negative and increasing
in πSS, the steady state level of debt (d¯
FA1
SS ) is negative in this case.
Case 2
(
1
βF
− 1
βS
− γ∂π
∂d¯
)
> 0, then when inflation increases, debt approaches its upper
bound, and since the derivative is positive and decreasing in πSS, the steady state level
of debt (d¯FA2SS ) is positive. Note, however, that both the upper bound and the derivative
are lower in the FA case relative for the FAj or g
FA(πSS) |πSS→∞< gFAj(πSS) |πSS→∞
and ∂g
FA(πSS)
∂πSS
< ∂g
FAj (πSS)
∂πSS
. Thus, we can rank the debt levels in the two fiscal authority
scenarios, extending the conclusions of Prop. 4(c).
Proposition 8. Suppose interest rates increase with debt according to
(85), and let T = ∞. Then if ¯˜z > (1/βS−1)2
4δ
or if α˜ is sufficiently large,
there is a unique steady state of the FA model, with less debt than the
steady state of the FAj, J = ∞ model.
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Summarizing, the large monetary union of BB99 has higher debt than a large
monetary union with national fiscal authorities, which in turn have higher debt than
a monetary union with a centralized fiscal authority. The debt with national fiscal
authorities is higher than in the social planner solution; but with a centralized fiscal
authority debt may actually be too low:
dFA1SS < 0 < d
FA2
SS < d
FAj
SS < d
BB99
SS . (90)
Figure 3 graphs the functions f(dSS) (the blue parabola) together with g
FAj(πSS),
gFA1(πSS), g
FA2(πSS). The horizontal axis represents inflation, and the vertical axis
represents debt. The parameterization shown satisfies ¯˜z > (1/βS−1)
2
4δ
, so the minimum
value of πSS on the parabola f is positive.
5 Policy implications
Fear of moral hazard continues to hold back possible agreements among EU nations that
would prevent self-fulfilling attacks on member states’ sovereign debt and cross-border
panics in the European banking system. The basic fear is that any mechanism capable
of preventing crises opens the door to irresponsible fiscal policies that count on future
Figure 3: Functions used to calculate debt and inflation.
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bailouts instead of ensuring long-run national budget balance. Therefore, designing an
institutional framework capable of ensuring long-run fiscal discipline could be crucial
for the establishment of a crisis prevention mechanism, and thus could be prove to be
the key to the long-run stability of the Eurozone.
Our model points to one powerful framework for fiscal discipline: the establishment
of a budgetary agency within the European Commision, mandated to ensure long-
run budget balance, which for the sake of concreteness we will call the European Fiscal
Authority (EFA). What exactly would the EFA do? First, it would necessarily take the
form of a forecasting agency, monitoring and predicting fiscal trends in each member
state. Second, it could provide advice to member governments about the likely fiscal
impact of new policy proposals. In these aspects, it would be similar to the “fiscal
monitoring councils” that all member states are required to establish under recent
European agreements (European Council (2012)).
But most importantly, the EFA would go beyond monitoring and advice: it would
exercise executive control over one or more powerful national fiscal instruments. In
particular, it would set instruments with a sufficient budgetary impact to give it ef-
fective control over the path of each member state’s public debt. Our model suggests
that this setup would decrease debt accumulation in three ways. First, as a technical
arm of the European bureaucracy, it would be unlikely to suffer the impatience typi-
cal of elected bodies. Second, controlling just a few instruments under a mandate to
maintain long-run budget balance, it would be likely to care more about the debt level
than a would government charged with balancing the concerns of countless competing
interest groups. Third, by taking its decisions at the union level, it would internalize
the common pool problems in member states’ budget choices.
Together, according to our model, these three mechanisms imply that debt is lower
in an economy with a union-wide fiscal authority than it is in an economy with national
fiscal authorities (Props. 4c and 8), which in turn is lower than the debt level in the
BB99 model of a large monetary union (Props. 3c and 7). Decreasing debt relative to
the BB99 model is beneficial, since we have seen that it is excessively high, compared
with the social planner’s solution (Props. 1 and 5). Ironically, what our model does not
rule out is the possibility that a union-wide fiscal authority may go too far, increas-
ing public saving beyond the social optimum. Taking this result seriously, we might
conclude that some other institutional setting (country-specific fiscal authorities, or
a federal fiscal government) would be superior to a union-wide fiscal authority. But
our baseline model was built around a very limited and probably unrealistic form of
deficit bias: as in Chari and Kehoe (2007), deficit bias arises only as a side effect of an
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insufficiently inflation-averse central bank. Therefore, in Section 4 we considered an ex-
tended model in which interest rate contagion also caused deficit bias in the monetary
union. Our ranking results were strengthened in this extension: moderate inflation
aversion was still sufficient, but no longer necessary, to prove that a monetary union
tends to accumulate more debt than a a single country (Prop. 5), and we showed that
a country-specific fiscal authority is insufficient, by itself, to reach the social planner’s
preferred debt level (Prop. 7).25
Our analysis is founded on the assumption that no policy makers can commit to
follow a rule. Thus, from the beginning we discard the possibility that the path of
debt may be altered by imposing rules on Eurozone member states. It is unclear to
us why advocates of “Fiscal Stability Union” are so eternally hopeful that rules will
be respected in the future when they have been broken repeatedly in the past. This
aspect of our analysis is more consistent than that of BB99, who build their model
on the assumption that the central bank cannot commit to follow a monetary policy
rule, but then inexplicably argue that governments could and should commit to a fiscal
rule. Instead, in our model all policy decisions represent equilibrium outcomes of games
between policy makers with different instruments and different preferences.26 Following
Rogoff (1985), we assume that institutional design may affect institutional preferences.
In particular, we assume that a budgetary agency with a mandate to maintain long-run
budget balance, with control over a few instruments that make this mandate feasible,
will act in a debt-averse manner. This is consistent with the apparent inflation aversion
of central banks that are mandated to maintain low inflation and control instruments
that make low inflation feasible.27
Our model addresses more explicitly the alternative possibility of establishing a
“Fiscal Transfer Union”, in which a federal government makes all fiscal decisions at the
union level. Such a framework would internalize the common pool problem in member
states’ budget decisions. But unlike the EFA framework, a federal government would
25Two additional sources of deficit bias that might further strengthen our results are nominal debt,
and moral hazard in bailout decisions. Member states might accumulate more debt if they expect it
to be inflated away, or if they expect to be bailed out, upon insolvency; such an expectation might be
justified if a failure to rescue them would induce contagion on other member states’ finances. These
are interesting issues for future research.
26In our deterministic model, there is no equilibrium role for rules. But a model of “sustainable
equilibria” might allow us to incorporate the imposition of rules and punishments as an equilibrium
outcome, along the lines of Chari and Kehoe (1990).
27Blinder (1998) strongly advocates interpreting the Rogoff (1985) model as an argument about the
effects of delegating instruments to an independent central bank, instead of the simplistic interpreta-
tion that the bank should “hire a conservative” as its governor.
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be subject to the budgetary disadvantages of the democratic political process: electoral
politics would make it impatient, and it would display no more debt aversion than any
other government. At the same time, it would give up the advantages of the European
principle of “subsidiarity”: by taking fiscal decisions at a more centralized level, it
would lose local information and thus would be likely to spend less efficiently. Our
model shows that this inefficient spending also tends to raise debt accumulation. For
all these reasons, the EFA is likely to provide stronger fiscal discipline than a European
government would. Moreover, keeping fiscal decisions as close as possible to the local
level is also a way of increasing their political legitimacy. In this sense, an unelected
European body charged only with ensuring long-run budget balance could actually
produce a more democratic outcome than would an elected European government with
wider fiscal powers.
If we accept that a strong fiscal disciplinary mechanism is indeed beneficial, and
compatible with democracy, several further questions arise. First, is it politically fea-
sible? Second, can effective fiscal instruments be established, in practice? And finally,
which fiscal instrument(s) would be most appropriate for delegation to a hypothetical
European Fiscal Agency?
In spite of the fact that delegation of fiscal instruments is not standard practice to-
day, it does seem politically feasible in the European context. Fiscally fragile countries
in the Eurozone still need assistance from the monetary authorities in order to avoid the
risk of speculative attacks coming from many possible directions (contagion in response
to the Cypriot bailout negotiations is only the most recent example). The monetary
authorities have many possible mechanisms to protect member states against specula-
tive attacks: one obvious possibility would be to cap the risk premium on a member
state’s debt, but there are many other alternatives. However, fiscally strong European
countries oppose monetary protection against speculative attacks, because they fear
moral hazard: the weaker countries might fail to balance their budgets if they take
ECB protection for granted.
These considerations point to a politically feasible quid pro quo. The European
Commission could establish a budget forecasting agency, which we will call the Euro-
pean Fiscal Authority. The Commission could then offer all member states the option
to delegate one or more fiscal instruments to the EFA, on a purely voluntary basis.
The EFA would then evaluate whether the instruments proposed for delegation by a
given member state give it effective control of that member state’s debt. When the
EFA judges that it has been granted effective control of the member state’s debt level—
including setting up the bureaucratic and legal framework for control of the proposed
instruments by the EFA— the member state would become immediately eligible for
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ECB protection against speculative attacks (by whatever mechanism the ECB judges
appropriate).28
Crucially, protection would remain contingent at all times on continuing approval
from the EFA. If at any time the EFA judges that its delegated instruments are less
powerful than expected, or if it judges that a member state has begun to “game the
system” in some way that makes it unable to control that state’s debt level, the EFA
would publicly revoke its approval of the delegated instruments (probably, but not
necessarily, after adequate advance warning to the member state). The ECB would
then be obliged to stop providing protection against attacks on that state’s sovereign
debt. One might question whether it is credible to threaten to eliminate a member
state’s protection against speculative attacks. There could be scope for moral hazard
if eliminating protection of the bonds of one country caused contagion to others. But
assuming that other fiscally fragile countries would be likely to participate in the EFA
system, scope for contagion would be greatly mitigated.
Finally, we come to the question of which instrument(s), if any, would be appro-
priate for delegating control of long-term budget balance to the European Commis-
sion. Concretely, in our model, the fiscal authority actually issues each member state’s
sovereign debt; the member government is then free to spend the cash proceeds. But
this is an unrealistic assumption, made only for mathematical convenience (and for
comparability with the BB99 paper). Most forms of public spending involve long-
term projects and long-term contracts that are costly and difficult to adjust rapidly;
therefore, in practice, most public spending decisions are planned long in advance,
and sovereign debt issuance is typically a residual, chosen after spending and taxes to
compensate any difference between the two. Indeed, formal control of debt issuance
may not suffice for de facto control of the debt. A recent example is discussion of the
issuance of “platinum coins” as a way to get around the US Congress’ legal control over
the US debt level. Likewise, in recent years many countries and regions have resorted
to issuing scrip or IOUs— or simply delaying payments— when for some reason they
have been unable to formally issue more sovereign debt.
On the other hand, formal control of debt issuance may also not be necessary
to achieve de facto control of the debt, as long as the EFA has control over some
other instrument that can have a rapid and powerful effect on the current deficit.
There are many possible ways to construct a powerful budgetary instrument of this
sort. Probably the simplest idea is that of Gruen (1997), who proposed defining a
multiplicative shift factor in the Australian tax code. He proposed applying this shift
28See de Blas (7 June 2012, VoxEU), for further discussion of the establishment of an EFA.
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factor to income taxes, VAT taxes, and all other types of taxes. Tax rates would take
whatever complicated functional form the Australian government decided, but would
subsequently by multiplied by a factor Xt, which would initially be set to one but
would thereafter be adjusted by an independent fiscal authority to ensure control of
the debt level.
Another instrument is implicit in the analysis of Gomes (2011), who shows that pub-
lic sector wages should optimally be state-contingent, rising in times of fiscal plenty
and falling when the budget is tight. Across-the-board shifts in public labor compen-
sation would have a powerful budgetary impact, and could in principle be performed
very quickly (particularly if they are a systematic aspect of public contracts, instead
of being an ad hoc crisis response, as they have often been in practice). Costain and
de Blas (2012a,b) go a step further and point out that all public sector prices could
be made effectively state-contingent by budgeting them in an alternative currency, the
value of which would be determined by the fiscal authority. In the European context,
this could be a way of reestablishing some of the nominal flexibility that is usually
assumed lost upon joining a monetary union.29 Finally, it is increasingly common that
pension systems automatically take into account demographic adjustment factors in
determining retirement ages or benefit levels. Additional adjustment factors related
to long-term budget trends would be another potentially powerful lever that could be
delegated to an independent fiscal authority.30
Each of these instruments has different political, economic, and distributional ef-
fects; ultimately it should be a democratic decision for each member state whether
or not to participate in the EFA mechanism, and if so, which instrument(s) it prefers
to delegate to the fiscal authority.31 All other fiscal instruments would remain un-
der the control of the member government, consistent with the European principle of
“subsidiarity”. The only decision in the hands of the fiscal authority itself would be
the technical and quantitative question of what setting of its delegated instrument is
consistent with long-run budget balance under its forecasts, given the fiscal decisions
of the member government.
29Dornbusch (1997) discusses a historical precedent for the idea of establishing a unit of account
different from the medium of exchange: Brazil’s successful disinflation program of 1994.
30A panel of experts appointed by the Spanish government recently recommended the establish-
ment of a “Factor de Revalorizacio´n Anual” that would regularly update pensions and/or pension
contributions in response to any persistent differences between the two; see El Pa´ıs (21 June 2013).
31Whether or not the analysis in this paper is robust to substituting actual debt issuance by another
instrument like those discussed here is an important question which we hope to pursue in future work.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the potential for the delegation of fiscal instruments to offset
systematic deficit bias in the fiscal decisions of democratic governments, with particu-
lar attention to the context of a monetary union. That is, we ask to what extent deficit
bias could be reduced by a fiscal authority that is independent of government and has
a mandate for long-run budget balance, just as independent, inflation-averse central
banks have helped reduce inflation bias. We follow the simple modeling strategy of
Rogoff (1985), characterizing differences across institutions by different weight param-
eters in their objective functions. First, we assume electoral politics induces impatience
in democratic institutions, relative to society’s discount rate; second, we assume that
mandating an institution to pursue a single, simple, quantitative objective skews its
preferences in favor of that objective, relative to the social welfare function.
This parsimonious treatment of institutions allows us to derive strong analytical
results comparing equilibrium outcomes across different institutional configurations.
We focus on perfect-foresight equilibria, in order to shed light on systematic biases.
We start from a baseline institutional framework, based on Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1999), in which a single central bank controls inflation for all the regions in a monetary
union, while region-specific democratic governments make all fiscal decisions in each
region. We compare several alternative configurations: (1) in each region, debt is issued
by a debt-averse regional fiscal authority, leaving all other fiscal decisions up to the
regional governments; (2) debt is issued for each region by a union-wide debt-averse
fiscal authority, leaving all other fiscal decisions up to the regional governments; (3) the
regional governments are replaced by a single, union-wide government. We show (a)
per capita debt is higher in the baseline scenario than it would be for a single country
with an independent monetary policy; (b) debt is excessive in the baseline scenario,
relative to a social planner’s solution; (c) debt is lower under region-specific fiscal
authorities than it is in the baseline scenario, and (d) it is lower still under a single,
union-wide fiscal authority. Under the scenario with a union-wide government (but
no fiscal authority), there is a tendency to accumulate less debt than in the baseline
scenario, because the common-pool problems in deficit choice are internalized, but the
other debt-avoiding properties of the fiscal authority are lost, and public spending
attains less bang for the buck due to a loss of informational efficiency.
Going beyond the model, we have discussed the role that fiscal delegation might
play in resolving the ongoing Eurozone crisis, where a disciplined fiscal regime is a
crucial counterpart (both economically and politically) to most of the monetary and
financial mechanisms currently under debate. A European Fiscal Authority controlling
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at least one sufficiently powerful fiscal instrument in a member state could guarantee
that state’s long-run budget balance. The member state itself would decide which
instrument to delegate, while the EFA would evaluate whether it is “sufficiently pow-
erful”. Delegation to the EFA would be attractive if it made member states eligible
for ECB protection against speculative attacks; but even without such a guarantee it
could be attractive as a way of improving fiscal credibility and lowering risk premia.
Therefore we have stressed that these institutions could be constructed in a voluntary,
step-by-step fashion. As long as fears of moral hazard persist, peripheral countries can
do little to achieve a union-wide agreement that would protect them against any future
shocks to the Eurozone. Reforming their fiscal institutions— possibly unilaterally— is
one way peripheral countries could jumpstart the negotiations for such an agreement.
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Therefore (93)-(94) hold if and only if
C˜πt ≡ κ˜Cπt < κ˜PCπ,Pt ≡ C˜π,Pt < R, (97)
˜πt ≡ κ˜πt ≤ κ˜P π,Pt ≡ ˜π,Pt ≤ ¯˜z, (98)
for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}.
In the last period, the budget constraint dT = 0 implies
C˜πT = C˜
π,P
T = R, (99)
˜πT = ˜
π,P
T =
¯˜z. (100)
In previous periods, we can evaluate the unknown coefficients by plugging (91)-(92)
into the inflation dynamics. For the BB99 regime (with J = ∞), we plug the linear
solution into (37) to evaluate C˜πt and ˜
π
t , given C˜
π
t+1 and ˜
π
t+1:
˜
7 Appendix: Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. We will use the superscript P to refer to the social planner
solution. Analogous quantities without superscripts refer to the BB99 model.
Given our linear-quadratic model, in which the only state variable is the debt level,
we expect a linear solution of the form
πt = C
π
t dt−1 + 
π
t (91)
dt = C
d
t dt−1 + 
d
t (92)
where Cπt , 
π
t , C
d
t , and 
d
t are coefficients to be determined, which will vary with time
in a finite-horizon solution. To show that the proposition is true, it will suffice to show
that for all times t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}, the coefficients satisfy
Cdt > C
d,P
t > 0, (93)
dt ≥ d,Pt ≥ 0. (94)
Positivity of the coefficients in (93)-(94) implies that if d−1 > 0, then dt > 0 for all
t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. The ranking of the coefficients in (93)-(94) then allows us to
conclude that if dt ≥ dPt for some t, then dt+1 > dPt+1 in the next period, and likewise
in future periods.
In each policy regime, the budget constraint implies that the coefficients for debt
and inflation are linked by
Cdt = R− κ˜Cπt , dt = ¯˜z − κ˜πt ; (95)
Cd,Pt = R− κ˜PCπ,Pt , d,Pt = ¯˜z − κ˜P π,Pt . (96)
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It is also easily shown by induction that
C˜π,Pt ˜
π
t = C˜
π
t ˜
π,P
t (106)
for all t ≤ T . Now, using (102) and (104), note that ˜πt < ˜π,Pt if and only if
βGR
(
1 + βSRC˜
π,P
t+1
)(
πt+1 + ¯˜zC˜
π
t+1
)
< βSR
(
1 + βGRC˜
π
t+1
)(
π,Pt+1 + ¯˜zC˜
π,P
t+1
)
which, using (106), is true if and only if
βG
(
πt+1 + ¯˜zC˜
π
t+1
)
< βS
(
π,Pt+1 + ¯˜zC˜
π,P
t+1
)
. (107)
Starting from 0 < πT = 
π,P
T =
¯˜z and using βG < βS and (105), it is easy to verify by
induction that 0 < πt < 
π,P
t for all t < T .
Finally, starting from π,PT =
¯˜z, notice that π,PT−1 is bounded above by ¯˜z:
˜π,Pt = βSR
˜πt+1 + z˜tC
π,P
t+1
1 + Cπ,Pt+1
≤ ¯˜z if ˜πt+1 ≤ ¯˜z (108)
C˜πt =
βGR
2C˜πt+1
1 + βGRC˜πt+1
, (101)
˜πt =
βGR˜
π
t+1 + ¯˜zβGRC˜
π
t+1
1 + βGRC˜πt+1
. (102)
Under the social planner solution, the inflation dynamics are instead given by (17).
Therefore the coefficients evolve according to
C˜π,Pt =
βSR
2C˜π,Pt+1
1 + βSRC˜
π,P
t+1
, (103)
˜π,Pt =
βSR˜
π,P
t+1 + ¯˜zβSRC˜
π,P
t+1
1 + βSRC˜
π,P
t+1
. (104)
Now note that (103) implies C˜π,Pt < R for any t < T . Together with (101), note
that C˜πt < C˜
π,P
t holds if and only if
βGR
2C˜πt+1
(
1 + βSRC˜
π,P
t+1
)
< βSR
2C˜π,Pt+1
(
1 + βGRC˜
π
t+1
)
,
which is true if and only if
βGC˜
π
t+1 < βSC˜
π,P
t+1 .
Therefore, starting from C˜πT = C˜
π,P
T = R and using βG < βS, we conclude by mathe-
matical induction that
C˜πt < C˜
π,P
t < R for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (105)
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Note that ρ− = 1 if
√
T 2F − 4/βF = TF − 2. Squaring both sides, this requires
T 2F − 4/βF = T 2F − 4TF + 4, which implies TF = β−1F + 1. Since ρ− decreases with TF ,
we conclude that ρ− < 1 as long as TF > β−1F + 1.
Using the definition of TF , we see that ρ− = 1 exactly if αdF = 0 and βFR = 1.
More generally, ρ− < 1 strictly as long as
1
βFR
+
α˜κ˜
βFR
+R− 1
βF
− 1 > 0, (113)
that is, as long as
αdF >
1
κ˜
(
απCαgF
αgG + καgC
)[
R + βFR− βFR2 − 1
]
. (114)
Thus there is one stable and one unstable eigenvalue, implying that a unique PFE
exists, as long as (114) is satisfied. QED.
And by induction we conclude
0 ≤ ˜πt ≤ ˜π,Pt ≤ ¯˜z for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (109)
QED.
Proof of Prop. 3(b). The matrix governing the dynamics of (66) has trace
TF = R +
1+α˜κ˜
βFR
and determinant β−1F . The associated eigenvalues are
ρ+ ≡ TF +
√
T 2F − 4/βF
2
, ρ− ≡ TF −
√
T 2F − 4/βF
2
. (110)
Note that T 2F −4/βF >
(
R− 1
βFR
)2
> 0; therefore both eigenvalues are real. Therefore
we also have
ρ+ >
R + 1+α˜κ˜
βFR
+
(
R− 1
βFR
)
2
= R +
α˜κ˜
2βFR
> 1. (111)
Since
√
T 2F − 4/βF is real and is less than TF , ρ− is positive. If we regard this
eigenvalue as a function of TF , then its derivative is
dρ−
dTF
=
1
2
− TF
2
√
T 2F − 4/βF
. (112)
Since
√
T 2F − 4/βF is real and is less than TF , dρ−dTF is negative.
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Proposition. Suppose J = ∞, T < ∞, βF > βG, αdF > 0, γF > 0,
and ¯˜zt = ¯˜z is a constant. Then starting from the same positive initial
average debt level d−1 = d
Fj
−1 = d
F
−1 > 0, equilibrium implies
dt > d
Fj
t > d
F
t for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (115)
Proof. As in Prop. 1, we expect a linear solution of the form (91)-(92). To prove
the proposition, we will show that for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}, the coefficients satisfy
Cdt > C
d,Fj
t > C
d,F
t > 0, (116)
dt ≥ d,Fjt ≥ 0, (117)

d,Fj
t ≥ d,Ft , (118)
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. As in Prop. 1, we expect a linear solution of the form
(91)-(92). For both lemmas, the backwards updating equation for the coefficient Cπt
can be written in the form
Cπt = h(C
π
t+1) ≡
R
κ˜
(
α˜ + βCπt+1(R + γC
π
t+1)
κ˜−1 + α˜ + βCπt+1(R + γC
π
t+1)
)
,
where we set β = βG and α˜ = 0 for the BB99, J = 1 case, and β = βF for the FA case.
Assuming γ > 0, h(C) is an increasing, concave function for C ≥ 0, bounded
above by R/κ˜, which crosses the 45o line at exactly one positive C. (If α˜ = 0, it
also crosses at C = 0, where it has slope greater than one, using the assumption of
moderate impatience.) Therefore, working backwards from CπT = R/κ˜, iteration on
h(C) converges to a positive limit Cπ∗.
If instead γ < 0, then h(C) is positive, increasing, concave, and bounded above
by R/κ˜ on the interval
(
0, R
2|γ|
)
. If α˜ > 0, then h(0) > 0; if instead α˜ = 0, then
h(0) = 0 and h′(0) > 1 (using the assumption of moderate impatience). The function
h(C) achieves a maximum at R
2|γ| , beyond which it decreases and eventually becomes
negative. Therefore, if R
κ˜
< R
2|γ| , h(C) crosses the 45
o line at exactly one C ∈
(
0, R
2|γ|
)
.
Therefore, if γ > − κ˜
2
, then working backwards from CπT = R/κ˜, iteration on h(C)
converges to a positive limit Cπ∗. QED.
Proof of Propositions 3(c) and 4(c). We will use the superscripts Fj and F to
refer to the models with a country-specific or union-wide fiscal authority, respectively;
quantities without superscripts refer to the BB99 model. Using this notation, Props.
3(c) and 4(c) can be stated jointly as follows.
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With a single union-wide authority (regardless of J), the inflation dynamics are given
by (64). Using the conjectured linear solution, we substitute ∂πt+1
∂d¯t
≡ Cπ,Ft+1 in (64). The
evolution of the coefficients is then:
Cπ,Ft =
R(α˜ + βFRC
π,F
t+1 + βFγF (C
π,F
t+1 )
2)
1 + κ˜(α˜ + βFRC
π,F
t+1 + βFγF (C
π,F
t+1 )
2)
, (128)
π,Ft =
(βFR + βFγFC
π,F
t+1 )
π,F
t+1 + ¯˜z(α˜ + βFRC
π,F
t+1 + βFγF (C
π,F
t+1 )
2)
1 + κ˜(α˜ + βFRC
π,F
t+1 + βFγF (C
π,F
t+1 )
2)
. (129)
which will be true if and only if, for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1},
Cπt < C
π,Fj
t < C
π,F
t <
R
κ˜
, (119)
πt ≤ π,Fjt ≤
¯˜z
κ˜
, (120)

π,Fj
t ≤ π,Ft . (121)
In the last period, the budget constraint dT = 0 implies
CπT = C
π,Fj
T = C
π,F
T =
R
κ˜
, (122)
πT = 
π,Fj
T = 
π,F
T =
¯˜z
κ˜
. (123)
Now for each policy regime, we can evaluate the coefficients by plugging (91)-(92) into
the inflation dynamics. For the BB99 regime (with J = ∞), we have
Cπt =
βGR
2Cπt+1
1 + κ˜βGRCπt+1
, (124)
πt =
βGR
π
t+1 + ¯˜zβGRC
π
t+1
1 + κ˜βGRCπt+1
. (125)
In the regime with national fiscal authorities (assuming J = ∞), the inflation dynamics
are given by (58), which implies that the coefficients are governed by
C
π,Fj
t =
R(α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1 )
1 + κ˜(α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1 )
, (126)

π,Fj
t =
βFR
π,Fj
t+1 + ¯˜z(α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1 )
1 + κ˜(α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1 )
. (127)
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Given (124) and (126), note that Cπt < C
π,Fj
t if and only if
βGRC
π
t+1
(
1 + κ˜(α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1 )
)
<
(
α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1
) (
1 + κ˜βGRC
π,
t+1
)
,
which is true if and only if
βGRC
π
t+1 < α˜ + βFRC
π,Fj
t+1 .
Using βG < βF and/or α˜ > 0, and starting from C
π
T = C
π,Fj
T = R/κ˜, we conclude
by induction that Cπt < C
π,Fj
t for all t < T . Assuming moderate inflation aversion
(γF > 0), a similar argument comparing (126) and (128) shows that C
π,Fj
t < C
π,F
t for
all t < T . Also, (128) shows that Cπ,Ft < R/κ˜. Summarizing, if γF > 0, and if βF ≥ βG
and α˜ ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality, then
0 < Cπt < C
π,Fj
t < C
π,F
t <
R
κ˜
for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (130)
These arguments ranking the Cπ coefficients under the three regimes are illustrated
in Fig. 4, which shows that the graph of (128) lies everywhere above (126), which in
turn lies above (124). The coefficients at each time are derived by iterating backwards
on these difference equations starting from CπT = C
π,Fj
T = C
π,F
T = R/κ˜, converging
towards the points where the graphs cross the 45o line; the ranking across coefficients
thus holds at all times t and also in the limit as t → −∞.
Next, note that in the final period, 
π,Fj
T =
¯˜z/κ˜. From here we can work backwards
to bound 
π,Fj
t at all times:

π,Fj
T−1 =
βFR¯˜z/κ˜+ ¯˜zΘt+1
1 + κ˜Θt+1
≤
¯˜z
κ˜
,
where Θt+1 ≡ α˜ + βFRCπ,Fjt+1 . By induction, we also have π,Fjt ≤ ¯˜z/κ˜ at all earlier t.
Now, if βF = βG and α˜ = 0, then (127) is equivalent to (125) (because then
Cπt+1 = C
π,Fj
t+1 ). Differentiating, we find that the right-hand side of (127) is increasing
in βF , and it is also weakly increasing in α˜ and C
π,Fj
t+1 if and only if ¯˜z − κ˜βFRπ,Fjt+1 ≥ 0,
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Figure 4: Example: Inflation coefficients.
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R/κ˜
Benchmark Union−wide FA Country FA
Note. Difference equation, calculating coefficient Cπt , given C
π
t . Graph shows that coefficients for BB99
model (blue line) always lie below the coefficients for the model with region-specific fiscal authorities
(red crosses), which in turn lie below the coefficients for the model with a single union-wide fiscal
authority (black circles), as stated in equation (119).
which is true since π,Fj ≤ ¯˜z/κ˜. Therefore, starting from πT = π,FjT and CπT = Cπ,FjT ,
we can reason backwards using (125) and (127) to show that πT−1 ≤ π,FjT−1 ≤ ¯˜z/κ˜. But
also, the right-hand side of (127) is increasing in 
π,Fj
t+1 . Thus we can work backwards
over all t < T , to conclude that if βF ≥ βG and α˜ ≥ 0, and ¯˜zt = ¯˜z is a constant, then
πt ≤ π,Fjt ≤
¯˜z
κ˜
for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (131)
Finally, when γF = 0, (129) is equivalent to (127). Differentiating (129) and per-
forming some simplifications, it can be shown that π,Ft is increasing in γF :
∂π,Ft
∂γF
=
¯˜ztβF (C
π,F
t+1 )
2 + βFC
π,F
t+1 
π,F
t+1 + α˜κ˜βFC
π,F
t+1 
π,F
t+1[
1 + κ˜(α˜ + βFRC
π,F
t+1 + βFγF (C
π,F
t+1 )
2)
]2 > 0. (132)
It is also easy to see that if γF ≥ 0, then π,Ft is increasing in π,Ft+1. Therefore, starting
from 
π,Fj
T = 
π,F
T =
¯˜z/κ˜, we can work backwards to show that under moderate inflation
aversion,

π,Fj
t ≤ π,Ft for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (133)
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But notice that in contrast to (131), we can not conclude that π,Ft is less than ¯˜z/κ˜.
Instead, starting from π,FT =
¯˜z/κ˜, (128) implies π,FT−1 > ¯˜z/κ˜ if βF (R + γFC
π,F
T ) > 1.
Now, (130) implies (116); (131) implies (117). Thus, starting from the same positive
debt level d−1 = d
Fj
−1 > 0, debt will remain higher in the BB99 monetary union than it
would be under national fiscal authorities; and in both cases, it will be positive:
d¯t > d¯
Fj
t > 0 for all t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. (134)
Next, (133) implies (118). If d¯Ft always remains positive, then (116) and (118) imply
that d¯
Fj
t > d¯
F
t at all times; if instead d¯
F
t eventually becomes negative, then we have
d¯
Fj
t > d¯
F
t since d¯
Fj
t is positive. Thus we have ranked the debt levels across the three
regimes at all times. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. Considering any one of the systems (80)-(84), let π = Π(d) be
the equilibrium relation between debt and inflation, and let d′ = B(d) be the gross
borrowing function (equilibrium debt next period, as a function of debt this period).
The budget constraint implies that these functions are related as follows:
B(d) = R(d)d− κ˜Π(d) + z˜ (135)
(κ˜ is replaced by κ˜P in the social planner version (80)). Differentiating and rearranging,
we must have
Π′(d) = κ˜−1 (R(d) +R′(d)d− B′(d)) . (136)
Note that a stable steady state d∗ is a point d∗ = B(d∗) characterized by B′(d∗) < 1.
Note that for any d, total interest payments are (R(d) − 1)d. Therefore interest
payments are increasing in debt if and only if R′(d)d + R(d) − 1 > 0. Thus, if
R′(d∗)d∗ + R(d∗) < 1 at the steady state debt level d∗, a permanent increase in debt
would imply permanently lower interest payments (equivalently, a permanent decrease
in asset holdings would imply permanently higher interest earnings). We have called
this extreme dynamic inefficiency, since an economy in this steady state could perma-
nently consume more by immediately eating up some of its savings (or by immediately
increasing its debt).
At a stable steady state where the economy is not extremely dynamically inefficient,
we have B′(d∗) < 1 < R′(d∗)d∗ +R(d∗), which implies Π′(d) > 0. QED.
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